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We examine the effects of diversity in the board of directors on corporate policies and risk. 
Using a multi-dimensional measure, we find that greater board diversity leads to lower volatility 
and better performance. The lower risk levels are largely due to diverse boards adopting more 
persistent and less risky financial policies. However, consistent with diversity fostering more 
efficient (real) risk-taking, firms with greater board diversity also invest persistently more in 
R&D and have more efficient innovation processes. Instrumental variable tests that exploit 
exogenous variation in firm access to the supply of diverse nonlocal directors indicate that 
these relations are causal. 
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Corporate board diversity has gained substantial political and media attention in recent years. 
Since 2008, six countries have adopted binding quotas to promote gender diversity on boards 
while several others have non-binding quotas or are considering legislation (Smith, 2014). 1 
Numerous studies examine the impact of gender diversity on boards, which is typically 
advocated on the grounds of attaining greater social equality or deepening the director talent 
pool.2 However, it is not clear whether gender is in fact the most important dimension of director 
diversity and there is far less research investigating other aspects.3 Moreover, most studies on 
diversity investigate only a narrow set of corporate outcomes, typically focusing on firm 
performance.4  
Using a multi-dimensional measure of diversity, we investigate the impact of board diversity on 
corporate outcomes primarily related to risk. Our focus on risk-related outcomes stems from 
economics and social psychology studies that suggest team diversity moderates group decisions 
(Sah and Stiglitz, 1986, 1991; Moscovici and Zavalloni, 1969). The direction of these effects, 
however, is largely an empirical question. 
                                                          
1 The six countries include: Norway, Finland, Iceland, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy. 
2 See Terjesen, Sealy, and Val Singh (2009), which reviews over 400 studies across disciplines on gender diversity 
on corporate boards. 
3 Both Carter, Simkins, and Simpson (2003) and Anand and Jog (2014) define diversity based on race and gender. 
Minton, Taillard, and Williamson (2014) investigate diversity in financial expertise of the board. Giannetti and Zhao 
(2016) focus mainly on ethnic diversity. The exception is Anderson, Reeb, and Zhao (2011) who measure board 
heterogeneity along several dimensions.  
4 In aiming to assess whether gender diversity is ultimately beneficial, most studies focus on firm performance or 
value (See Carter, Simkins, and Simpson (2003), Adams and Ferreira (2009), Farrell and Hersch (2005), and Ahern 
and Dittmar (2012), for examples). Exceptions include current work of Giannetti and Zhao (2016), who investigate 
the relation between board ethnic diversity and firm risk, and Carter, Franco, and Gine (2016), who show that 




On the one hand, the evidence in social psychology studies supports the view that diversity 
leads to moderated decisions (Kogan and Wallach, 1966), but no systematic evidence of these 
effects exists for the functioning of corporate boards. Our conjecture that diversity fosters 
moderation in board decisions is similar to the intuition of Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira (2005), 
who show that firm risk increases with CEO power. Adams et al. argue this is because powerful 
CEOs have the ability to make unchecked decisions, which leads to more idiosyncratic choices 
that result in more extreme outcomes and ultimately greater risk. Similarly, we argue that 
homogeneity of preferences, incentives, and views among board members would result in more 
idiosyncratic decisions, as they attract less scrutiny within the board. This lack of internal 
governance would ultimately manifest in the form of more volatile firm outcomes. Thus, by this 
logic, we conjecture that greater board diversity should lead to less volatile outcomes.  
On the other hand, it is certainly plausible that diversity would exacerbate conflicts and 
disrupt the board’s decision-making process, making the attainment of consensus harder and the 
resulting outcomes more erratic (Arrow, 1951). This alternative view implies that board diversity 
leads to higher rather than lower firm risk and outcome volatility. Ultimately, whether board 
diversity results in more or less volatile firm outcomes is the research question at the heart of our 
analysis. 
We begin our analysis by constructing a diversity index. The organizational behavior 
literature suggests that team diversity has many facets (Williams and O’Reilly, 1998). Therefore, 
we take a general approach, including multiple dimensions of diversity. We are agnostic about 
which aspects of diversity should matter for corporate policies related to risk and, admittedly, are 
partly driven by data availability in our choices. Our index is based on six dimensions, including 
both demographic and cognitive factors that are observable and widely available. These include 
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gender, age, ethnicity, educational background, financial expertise, and breadth of board 
experience.  
Consistent with our approach to measuring diversity, Baranchuk and Dybvig (2007) develop 
a model where board diversity encompasses multiple dimensions related to directors’ 
preferences, incentives, and access to information. An important takeaway of the model is that 
the combined effect of different sources of diversity affects the attainment of the consensus 
necessary for the well-functioning of a board, more so than any individual dimension.  
Using our multidimensional index, we show that greater board diversity is associated with 
lower realized firm risk. This is consistent with the theory that diversity moderates decisions. 
However, establishing the causality of this result is particularly challenging due to the 
endogenous nature of board composition (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Adams, Hermalin, and 
Weisbach, 2010). To do so, we propose a novel instrumental variable approach that builds on the 
work of Giroud (2013) and Bernstein et al. (2016), which may have wider applications in future 
studies of board composition. In particular, our instruments exploit the cross-sectional and time-
series variations in the existence and intensity of one-stop flight connections between the 
locations of potential director home addresses and firm headquarters. Our main instrumental 
variable is the diversity (based on our index) in the pool of nonlocal potential directors that 
reside within a non-stop flight from the firm headquarters.  
Notably, our instrumental variable is not mechanically correlated with the intensity of non-
stop flights to the headquarters from other cities in the U.S., which would require non-stop routes 
to hail predominantly from cities with more diverse director populations.5 Nor is it mechanically 
                                                          
5 Note that the addition of a new direct flight to a firm’s headquarters can either increase or decrease the diversity of 
the nonlocal director pool. If the new flight connects the headquarters location to an area composed of a 
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correlated with the size of the director population of the cities that are within a non-stop flight, 
since larger cities are not populated with more or less diverse potential directors according to our 
index. For the exclusion restriction to be violated, any omitted variable that determines firm risk 
must also be correlated with the existence of non-stop flights between firm headquarters and 
other U.S. cities as well as the diversity of the directors that reside in these locations.  
Moreover, consistent with the relevance condition of our instrument, we show that actual 
board diversity is indeed positively related to the diversity of nonlocal potential directors 
residing a non-stop flight away from firm headquarters. Importantly, we conduct supplemental 
tests to assess the conceptual underpinnings of our IV approach. First, we show that the 
geographical makeup of actual nonlocal board members of our sample firms reflects the degree 
of non-stop flight connectivity between the firm headquarters and the domicile of nonlocal 
potential directors. Second, we confirm that changes in actual board diversity are related to 
changes in the diversity of nonlocal potential directors resulting from additions and deletions of 
flight routes connecting to firm headquarters. Lastly, we show that our IV estimates are driven 
by the diversity of directors employed outside the firm as opposed to internal executive directors 
who should be less affected by the diversity of the nonlocal supply of directors.6 
Using the diversity of the nonlocal supply of directors as an instrument in two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) regressions, we find strong and consistent support for the notion that greater 
board diversity causes lower firm risk.7 Moreover, the 2SLS estimates highlight the positive bias 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
homogenous group of potential directors, then the diversity of the nonlocal pool of directors will likely decrease the 
diversity of the firm’s nonlocal director pool. 
6 Henceforth, we use the label “executive directors” for inside directors who also serve as executives of the firm. 
7 This finding is in contrast to that of Adams and Ragunathan (2015), who find that gender diversity is positively 
related to risk taking in the banking sector around the financial crisis, which they attribute to a selection effect. 
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embedded in OLS estimates. If director diversity makes corporate decisions less idiosyncratic, 
then firms operating in risky environments will find it optimal to select boards that are more 
diverse. Economically, the 2SLS estimates suggest that a one standard deviation increase in 
board diversity causes a 24-percentage point decrease in annual realized return volatility. This is 
about a one standard deviation decrease in volatility and holds using alternative measures of 
realized volatility and alternative index construction methodologies. 
Breaking down the index by its individual components or by component type (cognitive or 
demographic) reveals that no single component of diversity alone drives the relation between the 
diversity index and firm risk. Moreover, the combined effect of the index components on firm 
risk remains negative and significant when we in turn exclude any individual component. This 
evidence supports the theory of Baranchuk and Dybvig (2007), which implies that the board’s 
decision-making depends on the combined effect of different dimensions of board diversity.  
Board diversity, however, is not equally effective in all circumstances. First, its moderating 
effect on firm risk increases with the firm’s R&D intensity and growth opportunities, consistent 
with larger benefits from diversity when the firm profile is fundamentally riskier. Second, the 
moderating effect of board diversity on firm risk decreases in more volatile market conditions, 
when a nimbler decision process and swifter reactions may be more beneficial. Lastly, board 
diversity is less effective in moderating firm risk when a larger fraction of directors are co-opted 
or have longer tenure. This suggests that dynamics such as bondage to the CEO or emergence of 
“groupthink” that hamper the board’s monitoring role (e.g., Coles et al. (2014, 2015)) also 
reduce the effectiveness of board diversity as a risk-moderating mechanism. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Moreover, it is worth noting that our sample excludes financial institutions, where the purported selection effect of 
Adams and Ragunathan may be prevalent due to the specific nature of the underlying business. 
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In subsequent analysis, we focus on corporate financial and investment policies to gain 
further insights on the link between board diversity and realized volatility. To that end, we 
conduct two types of tests. We begin by examining whether board diversity affects the 
persistence of corporate policies. The rationale of these tests is that if diversity moderates board 
decisions, then corporate policies adopted by diverse boards should be more robust to changing 
conditions and, thus, be more persistent over time. Our evidence shows that indeed the 
persistence of corporate policies over one, two, or three-year windows increases with board 
diversity. These results support the idea that the lower ex post return volatility stemming from 
diverse boards is at least partly due to decisions that are ex ante less erratic. 
Next, we investigate whether board diversity affects firm policy choices that determine 
corporate financial and real ex ante risk-taking. From these tests, we find that firms with greater 
board diversity adopt less risky financial policies, consistent with the lower return volatility 
resulting from board diversity. In particular, firms with diverse boards rely less on debt capital 
and maintain greater dividend payouts. However, these patterns in financial policies do not come 
at the expense of firm investment intensity. In fact, if anything, firms with more diverse boards 
tend to invest more aggressively in research and development (R&D).  
The R&D results are particularly interesting because a greater focus on innovation activities 
is typically regarded as inherently riskier and could in principle increase firm fundamental 
volatility. Nonetheless, psychology and organizational behavior studies also suggest that 
diversity enhances the breadth of perspectives and in turn problem-solving skills of groups 
(Hoffman and Maier, 1961). Empirical studies support this view, showing that diverse teams are 
better problem-solvers (Hong and Page, 2004) and are also more innovative (Gao and Zhang, 
2014; Cao et al., 2016). Expanding on these findings, we investigate how board diversity affects 
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innovation output and success. Supporting the view that diversity fosters efficient innovation 
activities, we find that board diversity leads to greater innovation output (in absolute and per 
dollar invested) that is more impactful and original, as measured by firms’ patenting activity. 
Although board diversity reduces firm risk, it is not obvious that this is ultimately to the 
benefit of the firm shareholders. Indeed, diversity can generate more conflicts and reduce group 
cohesion (Becker, 1957; Hambrick, Cho, and Chen, 1996; Li and Wu, 2014). The decisions of 
diverse boards may then reflect inefficiently low risk-taking due to the inability to reach 
consensus on riskier policies, which leads to a “quite life” approach. Moreover, frictions inside 
the board may inefficiently lengthen the decision-making process (Hambrick et al., 1996). This 
would be especially problematic when firms need to react quickly, as suggested by the fact that 
the moderating effect of board diversity on risk is weaker when aggregate volatility is high.  
In light of these considerations, we conclude our analysis by investigating the impact of 
board diversity on firm performance and value. Our results show that, on average, both operating 
performance and asset valuation multiples increase with board diversity. This evidence indicates 
that the benefits of diverse views among directors outweigh the costs, in our sample. In fact, our 
results imply that the typical board composition in our sample reflects a constrained 
maximization, whereby greater diversity would be desirable. Nonetheless, the positive effect of 
diversity on firm performance and value is weaker when aggregate volatility is high, in line with 
the notion that diversity is more costly when flexibility is more valuable. 
Our study makes several contributions to the literature on the impact of board diversity and 
the importance of board composition more generally. First, our findings add to existing studies 
on the impact of board diversity by expanding both its definition and the corporate outcomes 
examined. Consistent with the theory of Baranchuk and Dybvig (2007), we show that the 
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multiple facets of board diversity jointly explain corporate policies and the resulting firm risk, 
more so than any single aspect of diversity. Moreover, while corporate officer surveys often 
suggest that diversity is beneficial, respondents can seldom articulate why (Krawiec, Conley, and 
Broome, 2013). Our evidence supports management’s beliefs and shows that board diversity 
lowers firm risk by producing more robust policy choices, reducing financial risk taking, and 
increasing the efficiency of innovation activities, and ultimately leads to better performance.8  
Moreover, we contribute to the literature on boards more generally by proposing a new 
method to identify the causal effects of board composition. The difficulties of drawing causal 
inferences in this literature due to the endogenous nature of board composition have long been 
recognized (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998). Hence, to gain insights about causality, researchers 
frequently rely on regulatory changes that affect board composition such as Sarbanes Oxley 
(Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2009) or the implementation of gender quotas (Ahern and Ditmar, 
2012). Semi-natural experiments that rely on regulatory changes, however, have recently come 
under more intense scrutiny by researchers who highlight the potential pitfalls of this 
experimental design (Hennessy and Strebulaev, 2015; Chelma and Hennessy, 2015).  
Our novel IV approach provides a framework for making causal inferences under more 
general circumstances, which can be used to complement and validate evidence from alternative 
approaches. Our method is similar in spirit to that of Knyazeva, Knyazeva, and Masulis (2013) 
(KKM, hereafter), who use the number of firms within sixty miles of the firm headquarters as a 
                                                          
8 These results stand in sharp contrast to those of Giannetti and Zhao (2016), who report positive associations 
between board ethnic diversity and the volatility of firm performance. Our analysis of the reation between ethnic 
diversity and realized risk does not support these findings, as we find that no single element of diversity alone can 
explain firm risk. However, we recognize that there are some differences in the measurement of director ethnicity, 
choice of instrumental variables, and samples between the two studies. 
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proxy for the local director supply. 9  An important difference, however, is that we exploit 
variation in the composition of the supply of nonlocal directors available to firms via non-stop 
flight routes. This improves on the KKM measure in two important ways. First, our instrument’s 
variation is generated by route decisions made by airlines and dwelling decisions made by 
directors, rather than firms’ location choices. In our context, this is particularly important 
because it alleviates concerns that the firm’s inherent risk profile or its drivers determine 
headquarters location choices and thus access to the local director pool. Second, our instrument 
better disentangles the effects of directors from managers since variation in our instrument 
depends on characteristics of the nonlocal director market, while managers naturally tend to 
reside in close proximity to the firm. 
2 Data, Variables, and Sample  
We begin this section by summarizing the construction of our sample and main variables. 
Then, in light of the fact that board diversity varies systematically with key firm and board 
characteristics, we discuss the conceptual underpinnings of our novel instrumental variable 
approach and the evidence that supports the relevance of our instrument for board diversity. 
2.1 Sample Construction 
Our sample comprises all non-financial, non-utility firms included in the intersection of the 
ExecuComp and RiskMetrics databases for the years from 1996 to 2014 for which there are 
available data to compute the diversity index. Our main outcome and control variables are based 
on data available in the Compustat and CRSP databases. In addition, we utilize the NBER patent 
                                                          
9 Local labor supply-based measures have also been used to instrument for executive selection. For example, both 
Huang and Kisgen (2015) and Carter et. al. (2016) use the local proportion of women elected to political offices to 
instrument for the appointment of female executives.  
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database and data on patenting activity from Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru, and Stoffman (2014) in 
our tests pertaining to firm innovation activities. 
To construct the board diversity index, we use data that are mostly from RiskMetrics, which 
includes information on director age, gender, race, financial expertise, and the number of 
directorships. In addition, we use data on directors’ educational background (i.e., college 
degrees) from the BoardEx database. We have complete data to construct the board diversity 
index for 70% of the original firm-year observations. After dropping observations with missing 
values for the control variables, our final sample consists of 21,572 firm-year observations. Panel 
A of Table 1 reports the sample summary statistics for the variables used in our empirical tests. 
2.2 Diversity Index 
The main variable of interest in our analysis is the diversity of directors sitting on the board. 
To measure diversity, we construct an index based on six distinct director characteristics. Our 
choice of characteristics is guided by the literature on diversity as well as data availability. 
Existing studies on diversity often distinguish between demographic (i.e. observable) and 
cognitive (i.e. unobservable) characteristics (e.g., Maznevski, 1994; Milliken and Martins, 1996). 
In line with this approach, we use three director characteristics for each of the two broad classes. 
However, we recognize that the classification may be ambiguous. For example, director 
demographics could plausibly affect cognitive characteristics to some extent. The director 
demographics that we use include gender, age, and ethnicity, whereas we use institution of 
college education, financial expertise, and other board experience to proxy for cognitive factors.  
We combine the six director characteristics into a board diversity index as follows. For each 
board-year, we calculate the fraction of female directors (PCT_FEMALE), the mean number of 
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other boards in the S&P1500 on which current members serve (NUM_BOARDS), the standard 
deviation of directors’ age (STDEV_AGE), and Herfindahl concentration indexes for director 
ethnicity (HHI_ETHNICITY), institution where the directors received their Bachelor’s degree 
(HHI_BACHELOR), and director financial expertise (HHI_FINEXPERT).10 In particular, we 
calculate HHI_ETHNICITY using ethnic categories of the board members as provided by 
RiskMetrics: White/Caucasian, African-American, Hispanic, Asian, and Other.11 We calculate 
HHI_BACHELOR using the institutions that granted the Bachelor’s degrees to each board 
member. For example, if two directors received Bachelor’s degrees from Harvard, one director 
from Stanford, and three from Yale, then HHI_BACHELOR is equal to 0.388 (i.e., (2/6)2 + 
(1/6)2 + (3/6)2). It is worth noting that we do not take into account the year of graduation and 
rather focus on the institution where the director graduated. Thus, HHI_BACHELOR aims to 
capture similarities in pedigree or training that stem from the culture of the institution granting 
the degree. Lastly, we calculate HHI_FINEXPERT using the binary variable for financial 
expertise provided by RiskMetrics. Thus, if four out of ten board members are financial experts, 
then HHI_FINEXPERT = (4/10)2 + (6/10)2 = 0.52. 
We normalize each diversity component by its mean and standard deviation, so that their 
scale is comparable, and then equally-weight each factor to construct the board diversity index: 
 BOARD_DIVERSITY= STDZ(PCT_FEMALE) + STDZ(STDEV_AGE)  
                                                          
10 We obtain almost identical results if instead of STDEV_AGE, we calculate the HHI of age by age groups, i.e., 20-
29, 30-39, 40-49, etc. We favor using STDEV_AGE because it does not induce mechanical changes in age diversity 
due to directors transitioning from one age bucket to the next. 
11 If we cannot retrieve director ethnicity from RiskMetrics – approximately 40% of the original sample, we use the 
Onomap classification algorithm based on director first and last name to assign the director to an ethnic group. 
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+ STDZ(NUM_BOARDS) – STDZ(HHI_ETHNICITY)  (1) 
– STDZ(HHI_BACHELOR) – STDZ(HHI_FINEXPERT) 
We subtract the HHI-based measures because higher values indicate higher concentration of 
the corresponding factor among the board members and, therefore, lower diversity. 12  The 
summary statistics in Panel A of Table 1 indicate that the average board exhibits more diversity 
in schooling than along ethnicity or financial expertise. Figure 1 provides a visual summary of 
the average board diversity index by firm headquarters state. The figure suggests that firms 
located in Midwest and East Coast states (except South Carolina) tend to have greater board 
diversity. Firms in Washington and Idaho also tend have diverse boards. Figure IA.1 in the 
Internet Appendix displays similar plots for the underlying components of the index. 
Panel B of Table 1 reports the simple correlations between each of the diversity index 
components, as well as the components and the index. Consistent with each measure capturing a 
distinct dimension of diversity, the various components of the index tend to be only weakly 
positively correlated with one another. The notable exception is the age-based diversity 
component, which is negatively correlated with most of the other components. 
2.3 Which Firms Have Diverse Boards? 
If board diversity matters, we would expect it to vary systematically across firms. In Table 2, 
we analyze the association between board diversity and various firm characteristics to understand 
                                                          
12We calculate the percent of the board that is female instead of a HHI measure for gender due to the nature of the 
data. The average board is 11% female, the 95th percentile is 27% female, and 28% of boards are all-male. Thus the 
concentration measures would be heavily skewed and may not be as meaningful. However, using the HHI of gender 
or an indicator for whether the board contains a female member yields almost identical overall results. 
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which firms tend to employ more diverse boards. The table reports the results of OLS regression 
models where the dependent variable is the diversity index. The independent variables consist of 
various time-varying firm characteristics (book assets, market-to-book ratio, leverage, etc.), CEO 
characteristics (tenure and position on the board), and firm location characteristics (based on 
headquarters county). In addition, we control for year, industry (Fama-French 49), and 
headquarters-county fixed effects, and report t-statistics adjusted for standard errors clustering at 
the firm level. The goal of this analysis is to assess whether board diversity varies systematically 
across firms, rather than to draw any causal inferences from the estimated relations. 
The evidence in Table 2 indeed shows that board diversity is not randomly distributed along 
dimensions that can plausibly affect firm risk. Specifically, the results indicate that older, larger 
growth firms that invest more in R&D tend to have more diverse boards. In terms of board 
composition, firms with larger boards and younger directors have greater overall board 
diversity. 13 Additionally, we find that firms with more diverse boards tend to be located in 
wealthier areas and have CEOs with shorter tenure and in dual roles. 
2.4 Instrumental Variable for Board Diversity 
The results in Table 2 indicate that board diversity varies systematically along dimensions 
that likely affect the volatility of firm outcomes (i.e., firm risk). This evidence highlights the 
potential problems that afflict any analysis aiming to establish causal effects of the composition 
of the board due to its endogenous nature. Throughout our analysis, we use a novel director 
supply-based instrumental variable approach to tackle the challenge of capturing plausibly 
                                                          
13 The age component of our diversity index is measured as the dispersion of director ages, so it is not immediately 
obvious whether the average age of the board members should be positively or negatively associated with diversity. 
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exogenous variation in board diversity.14 In particular, we instrument the firm’s board diversity 
by the diversity of the supply of nonlocal potential directors residing one non-stop flight away 
from the firm headquarters. 
The logic of our approach rests on the idea that a director’s travel costs determine the 
likelihood of a firm-director match, similar to the local director supply argument in KKM (2013). 
Different from KKM, however, our IV approach exploits the fact that the personal costs of 
performing a task at a distant location decrease with the availability of non-stop flights between 
the agent performing the task and its location, as in Giroud (2013) and Bernstein et al. (2016). 
Specifically, our instrumental variable is the average diversity of nonlocal potential directors 
weighted by the frequency of non-stop flights connecting director residence and firm 
headquarters locations.  
The exogenous variation in our instrumental variable stems from cross-sectional and time-
series variations in the diversity of the supply of nonlocal directors available to firms via non-
stop flight routes – as opposed to the availability of local directors as in KKM. This is important 
in our context, given that firm access to local directors necessarily reflects the firm headquarters’ 
location choice, which may in turn depend on or influence the firm’s risk profile. This logical 
chain of relations implies that local supply-based instruments would likely violate the exclusion 
restriction in our context. Instead, the variation in our instrument reflects airlines’ decisions 
about air routes as well as nonlocal directors’ dwelling decisions, which alleviates concerns 
about violations of the exclusion restriction. 
                                                          
14 For the sake of brevity, we limit our discussion here to the intuition behind our main IV, including its conceptual 
underpinnings and empirical relevance. Appendix A expands this discussion by providing greater details about the 




The conceptual premise for the relevance of our IV is that the existence of non-stop flights 
between director domiciles and firm headquarters determines the geographic composition of the 
board. The analysis in Table A.1 of Appendix A explicitly tests this conjecture. There we 
examine whether the likelihood that nonlocal potential directors serve on a board depends on the 
existence and frequency of non-stop flights connecting the director domicile and the firm 
headquarters locations, consistent with our hypothesized channel.  
The supplemental evidence in Appendix A strongly supports our main conjecture. Indeed, 
consistent with KKM (2013), we find that physical distance between firms and potential 
directors greatly reduces the likelihood of a firm-director match. However, physical distance 
between firm headquarters and director domiciles becomes increasingly irrelevant as the 
frequency of non-stop flights between those locations increases. The magnitude of this effect is 
economically meaningful. For example, for distant counties where the population of potential 
directors is one standard deviation above the mean county, a one standard deviation increase in 
the availability of non-stop flights connecting to the firm headquarters increases the frequency of 
director-firm match by 25%.  
Overall, the evidence in Appendix A validates the logical premise of our IV approach and 
alleviates concerns that first-stage IV estimation results in our subsequent tests may be spurious. 
3 Board Diversity and Firm Risk 
In this section, we discuss our baseline evidence about the effects of board diversity on firm 
risk as measured by the volatility of stock returns. We then discuss the results of tests that focus 
on the effects of different sources of diversity included in the aggregate index and on the 
conditional effects of diversity on firm risk. 
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3.1 Does Board Diversity Affect Stock Return Volatility? 
Our main conjecture is that board diversity determines the degree to which idiosyncrasies in 
directors’ preferences, incentives, and access to information affect the decision-making process 
of the board. As such, diversity among directors should have a first order impact on the risk 
associated with the outcome of board decisions. 
Table 3 presents the results of our baseline tests. The dependent variable of interest in the 
estimated firm-year regression models is the annualized total volatility of daily stock returns.15 
All specifications include a host of controls for time-varying firm and CEO characteristics as 
well as characteristics of the firm headquarters-county. Columns 1 and 2 report OLS estimates, 
where Column 1 includes fixed effects for year, industry (i.e., Fama and French (1997) 49-
industry), and headquarters-county, while Column 2 replaces industry and county with firm fixed 
effects. Columns 3 and 4 report the first and second stage results for our IV estimation. All of the 
t-statistics in the table are based on standard errors clustered at the firm level. Moreover, for ease 
of interpretation, all of the independent variables, including the Diversity Index, are normalized 
to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one. 
The evidence in Table 3 shows that higher board diversity is associated with lower realized 
stock return volatility, independent of the specification or estimation approach. This evidence 
supports the hypothesis that more diverse groups would make more moderated decisions, which 
are ultimately reflected in realized volatility. For example, the coefficient estimate on the 
Diversity Index in Column 1 implies that a one standard deviation increase in board diversity is 
                                                          
15 In Table IA.1 of the Internet Appendix, we repeat our tests using instead the idiosyncratic volatility of daily 
returns, the total volatility of monthly returns, or the idiosyncratic volatility of monthly returns. We obtain consistent 
results across these alternative measures. 
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associated with a decrease in annualized volatility of 0.80 percentage points. However, the 
results in Column 1 may be biased due to omitted variables as well as the plausibly endogenous 
nature of board composition. 
The OLS estimates in Column 2 show that the results in Column 1 cannot be explained by 
omitted time-invariant factors at the firm level, such as corporate culture for example. We 
continue to find that there is a negative and significant association between board diversity and 
stock return volatility after controlling for firm fixed effects. Therefore, the relation between 
volatility and board diversity does not appear to be due to a spurious correlation between time-
invariant components of board diversity and corporate risk-taking style. These results, however, 
cannot rule out the possibility that omitted time-varying factors jointly determine firm risk and 
board composition, or that the firm time-varying risk profile drives board diversity. 
In particular, one can plausibly envision the endogeneity bias going in either direction, 
depending on how board diversity affects the decision-making process. On the one hand, if 
diversity is anticipated to disrupt the deliberation process and make the resulting outcomes more 
erratic (Arrow, 1951), then firms that operate in more volatile environments may find it optimal 
to have less diversity in the board. This line of reasoning implies that OLS estimates are 
negatively biased and thus the bias may explain our baseline results. On the other hand, if 
directors’ heterogeneity results in the synthesis of diverse views that make corporate decisions 
less idiosyncratic, then firms that operate in more volatile environments may find it optimal to 
have more diversity in the board. Contrary to the first view, this implies the OLS estimates are 




As previously explained, we propose a novel IV approach to tackle the challenges associated 
with omitted variable and endogeneity bias in the context of causal effects of board composition. 
Columns 3 and 4 in Table 3 report the resulting first and second stage IV estimates, respectively. 
The first stage estimates show that there is a significant (at the 1% level), positive relation 
between the diversity of directors on the board and the diversity of nonlocal potential directors 
available to the firm via nonstop flights. The t-statistic on the first stage instrument is 2.8 and the 
F-statistic is greater than 10, which passes the “weak instrument test” of Stock and Yogo (2005). 
This confirms that our instrument is (empirically) relevant, as suggested by the supplemental 
evidence in Appendix A discussed earlier. Interestingly, the economic effect of the diversity 
available in the supply of nonlocal directors is comparable to that of local directors – i.e., 0.05 
vs. 0.06, respectively. Moreover, the estimated coefficients on the remaining first-stage control 
variables are broadly in line with those reported in Table 2. 
The second stage IV estimates of the relation between board diversity and firm risk are 
qualitatively in line with the OLS results. That is, board diversity instrumented with the diversity 
of accessible nonlocal directors has a large negative and statistically significant effect on the firm 
stock return volatility. However, it is noteworthy that the negative impact of the instrumented 
board diversity is an order of magnitude larger than the OLS estimates, which suggests the latter 
are positively biased. In turn, this supports the argument that higher unconditional risk may lead 
firms to rely optimally on more diverse boards, if such heterogeneity helps to manage more 
efficiently and ultimately temper the firm’s (unconditional) risk.  
One concern with the IV tests in Table 3 may be that the diversity of potential non-local 
directors co-varies with the diversity of potential local directors and the instrumented board 
diversity reflects this underlying relation. This in turn would explain why local diversity does not 
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matter in the second stage of the IV estimation. To address this concern we conduct two 
supplemental tests. 16  In the first test, we estimate our baseline model while excluding the 
diversity of potential local directors and find that our estimates of interest are nearly identical. In 
the second test, we estimate our model within subsets of firms with high and low diversity of 
potential local directors, and find that our results hold across the two subsamples. Overall, this 
evidence indicates that the relation between the diversity of potential local and nonlocal directors 
cannot alone explain our baseline results. 
The model specifications in Table 3 include fixed effects for firm headquarters counties. 
This approach effectively controls for both the average diversity of potential directors residing in 
the firm headquarters county as well as the average diversity of nonlocal potential directors 
residing one non-stop flight away from the headquarters. An alternative approach to testing the 
causal impact of board diversity on volatility is to focus on the relation between changes in 
realized volatility and changes in board diversity that stem from variation in non-stop airline 
routes.  
Table 4 reports the results of this alternative testing strategy. Here, we begin by examining 
whether changes in the actual board diversity depend on changes in the diversity of the pool of 
nonlocal potential directors due to additions or deletions of non-stop flight routes connecting to 
the headquarters. Specifically, we test whether changes in our IV stemming from changes in non-
stop flight routes explain subsequent changes in board diversity. Since most director 
appointments are between three to five years, we use changes in board diversity three years 
ahead to allow the composition of the board to adjust to changes in flight routes. The evidence in 
Column 1 of Table 4 lines up with the estimates in Column 3 of Table 3 and supports the 
                                                          
16 Tables IA.2 and IA.3 of the Internet Appendix report the results of these supplemental tests. 
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premise of our IV approach. Specifically, consistent with a causal impact, changes in the 
diversity of nonlocal potential directors resulting from additions or deletions of flight routes 
explain subsequent changes in the actual diversity of the typical board.  
Next, we examine whether changes in board diversity instrumented with changes in the 
diversity of nonlocal potential directors due to flight route changes explain changes in volatility. 
This analysis is similar in spirit to our baseline tests, with the exception that we measure all of 
the variables of interest in changes over the relevant three-year window. The second stage IV 
estimates from this model, in Column 2 of Table 4, are in line with our baseline evidence and 
inferences. That is, the instrumented changes in board diversity are inversely related to changes 
in firm volatility measured over the same window. Therefore, increases (decreases) in board 
diversity resulting from increased (decreased) diversity in the pool of nonlocal potential directors 
due to flight route changes result in lower (higher) firm volatility. This evidence provides strong 
support for the idea that changes in board diversity stemming from flight route changes 
ultimately cause changes in firm volatility. 
Overall, the results in Tables 3 and 4 demonstrate that there is a strong negative relation 
between board diversity and firm risk as measured by the volatility of stock returns. The 
evidence is consistent with the notion that board diversity has a causal impact on firm risk. 
Furthermore, our analysis underscores the importance of accounting for the potential 
endogeneity of board composition when evaluating the causal impact of board diversity. 
3.2 Which Sources of Diversity Matter More for Firm Risk? 
In the next set of tests, we examine whether the baseline results reported in Table 3 reflect 
dominant effects of some particular source of board diversity. We first examine whether the 
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effects of aggregate diversity mask the impact of specific components of the index. We then 
repeat the baseline tests focusing on the diversity added to the board by directors who are not 
executives of the firm, which is particularly important in light of our IV estimation approach. 
Table 5 reports the results of the analysis that we conduct to assess the impact of the various 
components of the board diversity index on our baseline results. Panel A reports the second stage 
IV estimates that we obtain when we repeat our analysis while focusing on the individual 
components of the index. Panel B reports the second stage IV estimates obtained when we in 
turn exclude each individual component from the index.17  
The results in Panel A and B of Table 5 suggest that no single component of the diversity 
index drives our baseline inferences concerning the effect of aggregate board diversity. First, the 
estimates in Panel A indicate that each single instrumented component does not affect return 
volatility, except for a statistically marginal effect of gender diversity. Second, we find that our 
baseline results are robust when we omit any one of the individual components from the index. 
Overall, these results imply that the common variation in different aspects of board diversity 
affects the decision-making process and ultimately the volatility of firm outcomes. This is in line 
with the main implication of the Baranchuk and Dybvig (2007) model, whereby the combined 
effect of different sources of diversity affects the functioning of a board.  
In Panel C of Table 5, we instead group the six components of board diversity into two 
separate indexes that reflect the broad nature of the different components. In particular, we 
construct an index for demographic diversity, based on age, gender, and ethnicity, and one for 
                                                          
17 We obtain qualitatively similar results when we estimate the models by OLS, as shown in Panels A and B of 
Table IA.2 of the Internet Appendix.  
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cognitive diversity, based on educational background, financial expertise, and outside board 
experience. We then repeat the tests reported in Table 3 for each separate index.  
The OLS estimates in Panel C suggest that firm risk covaries negatively with board diversity 
along both the demographic and cognitive dimensions – see Columns 1 and 2. However, while 
the first stage IV estimates indicate that the accessible diversity of nonlocal potential directors 
matters along both dimensions – i.e., Columns 3 and 5, only the instrumented cognitive diversity 
index retains a statistically significant impact on firm risk. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that the 
economic magnitude of the effects of either type of diversity on risk is roughly four to seven 
times smaller than the baseline estimate in Table 3 for the aggregate index. Therefore, in line 
with the takeaway from Panels A and B, the results in Panel C further support the notion that no 
single category alone fully captures the effects of diversity on firm risk. 
In Table 6, we repeat our tests while separating the effect of diversity added to the board by 
executive versus non-executive directors.18 The motivation for this analysis is two-fold. First, it 
is not obvious that diversity added by executive directors should be meaningful, given that they 
interact daily and thus could tend to develop more homogenous views about decisions that affect 
firm risk. Second, the logic of our IV estimation approach does not strictly apply to executive 
directors, as they will naturally tend to reside in relative proximity of the firm headquarters.  
Consistent with our priors, both the OLS and IV estimates in Table 6 indicate that the 
negative relation between firm risk and board diversity is predominantly due to the incremental 
diversity brought to the board by non-executive directors. Indeed, the magnitude of the OLS 
estimate for the effect of diversity added by non-executive directors in Column 1 is over three 
                                                          
18 As explained in footnote 6, “executive directors” refers to directors who also serve as executives of the same firm. 
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times larger than that for executives in Column 4. Similarly, the corresponding IV estimate for 
non–executives in Column 3 is roughly 25% larger than the baseline IV estimate for the effect of 
aggregate board diversity in Table 3. Moreover, in line with the logic of our IV estimation, the 
first stage results in Columns 2 and 5 show that the relation between our instrument (i.e., 
diversity of accessible nonlocal potential directors) and the aggregate diversity of the board is 
due to the diversity added by non-executive directors.19  
3.3 When Does Diversity Matter More for Firm Risk? 
The evidence so far consistently shows that board diversity leads to lower risk for 
shareholders. It is plausible, however, that the effects of board diversity on risk would vary along 
dimensions that determine the optimal composition and role of the board. We examine here 
whether the effect of diversity on risk depends on firm, board, and market-wide characteristics 
that should affect the tradeoffs underlying the board composition and its role.  
For example, if the benefits of diversity increase with the fundamental risk of the firm as 
previously discussed and the discrepancy between OLS and IV estimates confirms, we would 
expect the moderating effect of diversity to be larger in such circumstances. Conversely, we 
expect the moderating effect of diversity to be smaller when the environment in which the firm 
operates becomes (ex post) more volatile and changing circumstances require quicker reaction 
times and resolute decision-making (Hambrick, Cho, and Chen, 1996). Furthermore, to the 
extent that the effect of board diversity partly stems from its monitoring functions, we expect 
diversity to become less effective when other dynamics of the board hamper those functions. 
                                                          
19 Indeed, for four of the six components of the diversity index, the evidence in Table IA.5 of the Internet Appendix 
shows that the diversity added by non-executive directors strongly depends on the diversity of nonlocal potential 
directors residing a nonstop flight away from the firm headquarters. 
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We examine the implications of these lines of reasoning in Table 7, which reports the second 
stage IV estimates of the effect of board diversity on firm risk conditional on various firm, board, 
and market-wide factors. Specifically, we use indicators for firms with above median asset 
market-to-book ratios and R&D investment intensity to proxy for firms with high fundamental 
risk, and an indicator for high level of market-wide volatility (i.e., VIX index) to proxy for times 
of broader changes in the environment. Based on the evidence in Coles et al. (2014, 2015), we 
use indicators for firms with an above median proportion of coopted or long-tenured directors to 
proxy for board dynamics that are likely to hamper its monitoring function. 
The results in Table 7 are broadly consistent with the conjecture that board diversity is not 
equally effective under all circumstances. First, the evidence in Columns 1 and 2 shows that 
board diversity has a larger moderating effect on stock volatility when firm fundamental risk is 
higher, i.e., higher R&D investment intensity or asset market-to-book ratios. This is consistent 
with the earlier suggestion that these types of firms benefit most from a more diverse 
composition of the board. Conversely, the estimates in Column 3 indicate that board diversity 
exacerbates the effects of market-wide volatility on firm risk. Thus, board diversity is less 
effective when uncertainty in the broader environment increases and a nimbler decision process 
may be needed. Lastly, in Columns 4 and 5, we find that board diversity is less effective in 
moderating firm risk when a larger fraction of directors are co-opted or have longer tenure on the 
board, respectively. This evidence suggests that other dynamics of the board decision-making 
process play a key role with respect to the effectiveness of diversity as a risk-moderating factor. 
Overall, the evidence discussed in this section reinforces the notion that the joint effect of 
different aspects of board diversity is what matters for firm risk, as opposed to any single aspect. 
Furthermore, the results indicate that the heterogeneity added to the board by outside directors is 
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of first order importance for the risk associated with corporate decisions. Finally, we find that the 
strength of the link between board diversity and firm risk depends on the circumstances that 
should affect the optimal composition of the board and the effectiveness of its monitoring role. 
4 Board Diversity and Corporate Policies 
Our evidence to this point shows that diversity in the board of directors has a large 
moderating impact on ex post volatility of stock returns, consistent with lower risk. In this 
section, we shift our focus on corporate policies to gain insights on the channels through which 
board diversity affects the firm ex ante risk profile.  
We begin by examining whether the persistence of corporate policies depends on board 
diversity. If board diversity affects volatility due to a moderating effect, then the policies adopted 
by diverse boards should be more stable and persistent. Next, we investigate whether board 
diversity explains the patterns in financial and investment policies that theory suggests should 
determine firm risk. Lastly, we focus on a fundamental output of the firm investment strategy 
whose efficiency can have a large impact on firm risk. Namely, we examine whether board 
diversity affects the efficiency of corporate innovation in ways that are consistent with its effects 
on firm risk. 
4.1 Board Diversity and Policy Persistence 
In our baseline tests, we rely on realized stock volatility as a simple summary measure that 
should reflect idiosyncrasies in the board’s decision-making process. We interpret the negative 
relation between board diversity and realized volatility as consistent with the conjecture that 
diversity fosters moderation in board decisions. This approach, however, has some drawbacks. 
Although we control for obvious determinants of fundamental risk, realized stock volatility is by 
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construction an ex post measure that depends on a host of other factors, in addition to moderation 
in the board decision-making process. For example, for a firm pursing a high growth strategy, 
higher volatility may be optimal rather than reflective of board decisions that are more erratic.  
To address this concern and gain further insights on whether moderation resulting from 
board diversity affects firm risk, we examine the time-series properties of firm policies. In 
particular, if diversity reduces idiosyncrasies in board decisions, then firms with diverse boards 
should need to change course less often or abruptly. In other words, the policies adopted by 
diverse boards should be more stable and robust to changing conditions, which would increase 
the persistence of such policies over time.  
In our tests, we focus on the firm’s investment in physical assets (Capex/Assets), innovation 
(R&D/Assets), and brand building (Advertising/Sales), as well as its reliance on debt capital (Net 
Book Leverage) and propensity to pay dividends (Dividend/Equity). Since the importance of 
these policies differs across firms and industries, we also construct a summary policy index that 
aggregates the five separate (standardized) policy measures. For each of these variables, we 
measure the persistence of the corresponding policy from year to year by estimating the relation 
between the observed policy one year ahead and the current policy. To test whether the 
persistence of a policy depends on board diversity, we include the interaction between the 
current policy and the current instrumented diversity of the board – while controlling for the 
stand-alone effect of diversity. 
Table 8 reports the evidence from these tests. The results in Columns 1-5 show that each of 
the policies we examine is highly persistent, with coefficient estimates ranging from 0.69 to 0.94 
for the average board. Relevant for our purposes, we also find that the coefficient estimate on the 
interaction between each policy and the instrumented diversity is positive and statistically 
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significant at least at the 10% probability level. This evidence is consistent with the notion that 
greater board diversity leads to moderated and thus more persistent policies.  
When we focus on the aggregate policy index, we obtain similar results and the implied 
magnitude of the effect of diversity on policy persistence is large. Specifically, the estimates in 
Column 6 imply that the overall persistence of firm policies increases by approximately ten 
percent, on average, if the instrumented diversity increases by one standard deviation. Notably, 
the magnitude of the effect of diversity on policy persistence becomes larger when we extend the 
horizon of our tests to two and three years ahead in Columns 7 and 8. In particular, when we 
extend the horizon from one to three years, the policy persistence of an average firm declines by 
more than 13 percent, i.e., (0.84-0.73)/0.84, while the decline for a firm with instrumented board 
diversity one standard deviation above the mean is only six percent, i.e., (0.93-0.875)/0.93. 
4.2 Effect of Board Diversity on Financial and Investment Policies  
Next, we examine whether board diversity affects financial and investment policies that 
directors can influence in their advisory and monitoring roles. Table 9 reports second stage IV 
estimates for various firm policy models: net book leverage, net market leverage, dividend-to-
equity ratio, CAPEX-to-asset ratio, and R&D-to-asset ratio.20 For each model, the first stage (not 
shown for brevity) consists of the board diversity index regressed on our main instrument as well 
as all other controls. The specification of the models in Table 9 mirrors that of the 2SLS models 
reported in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3. 
Consistent with diverse boards adopting policies that reduce the risk borne by shareholders, 
the second stage estimates in Columns 1-3 of Table 9 show that greater board diversity leads to 
                                                          
20 We do not include the ratio of Advertising-to-Sales in these tests because it is not obvious conceptually what 
effect advertising intensity may have on firm fundamental risk. 
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policies associated with lower financial risk. In particular, all else equal, firms with more diverse 
boards rely relatively less on debt capital and sustain higher dividend yields for shareholders. On 
average, a one standard deviation increase in the instrumented board diversity is associated with 
a reduction in net market and book financial leverage of 0.57 and 1.22 standard deviations, 
respectively, and an increase in dividend returns to shareholders of 1.1 standard deviations. 
Although diverse boards rely relatively less on debt capital and support greater returns to 
shareholders in the form of dividends, we find no evidence that this comes at the expenses of the 
firm’s organic growth. Indeed, the evidence in Column 4 indicates that the instrumented board 
diversity has no statistically significant impact on the level of firm investment in physical assets. 
In fact, the second stage IV estimate in Column 5 implies that, on average, more diversity in the 
board systematically leads to higher R&D spending. Thus, if anything, boards that are more 
diverse promote larger investments in innovation activities that can foster firm growth. 
The effect of board diversity on R&D investment is economically large. A one standard 
deviation increase in instrumented board diversity is associated with an increase in R&D 
investment intensity of 0.92 standard deviations. This result is intriguing given that R&D 
investments are typically regarded as riskier, which may seem at odds with our baseline results. 
However, existing research also suggests that diversity can lead to more efficient risk-taking by 
fostering original and innovative ideas (Hoffman and Maier, 1961). In line with this latter view, 
the results in Table 7 indicate that the reduction in firm risk due to greater board diversity is 
indeed larger for firms that have more growth opportunities and invest more in R&D. In the next 
section, we delve further into this issue by directly examining the effect of board diversity on the 
efficiency of firm innovation activities. 
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4.3 Effect of Board Diversity on Innovation Efficiency 
To test whether board diversity explains the output and quality of firm innovation activities, 
we continue to instrument for board diversity using the diversity of nonlocal directors available 
to the firm via nonstop flight routes. The outcome variables of interest are various measures of 
both the quantity and quality of the firm innovation output. We use the log number of patents to 
measure the firm absolute innovation output, the ratio of patents to R&D expenses to measure 
the relative innovation output per (million) dollar invested, the log number of patent citations to 
measure the aggregate quality of the innovation output, the log number of citations per patent as 
a measure of average patent quality, and patent originality as an alternative measure of patent 
quality.  
Table 10 reports the results of this analysis. The evidence implies that the higher R&D 
investments made by firms with greater board diversity is at least partly justified by a greater 
efficiency of their innovation process. Across the board, the results in Table 10 indicate that the 
instrumented board diversity has a positive and statistically significant effect on the quantity and 
quality of the firm innovation. Greater diversity among directors is associated with larger 
innovation output, both in absolute terms as well as per dollar of R&D investment. Moreover, the 
quality of the firm innovation output as measured by total number of patent citations, number of 
citations per patent, and patent originality increases with board diversity.21 
The economic magnitude of the estimated effects of board diversity on innovation output is 
large. For example, a one standard deviation increase in board diversity is associated with an 
increase of 2.7 standard deviations in the number of patents and 1.7 standard deviations in the 
                                                          
21 The sample size drops in columns (2) and (5) due to missing/zero R&D data and missing patent originality data 
after 2006, respectively. 
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number of patents per million dollars of R&D expenses. The economic magnitude of the relation 
between board diversity and the various measures of patent quality is equally large. 
One question raised by the results in Table 10 concerns the channel through which board 
diversity may affect the actual output of the firm innovation activities. On the one hand, it is 
conceivable that more diverse directors could lead to a more efficient allocation of the firm R&D 
resources ex ante, to the extent that the board plays an important advisory role in that respect. On 
the other hand, diversity in the board could facilitate more efficient monitoring of the firm capital 
budget and facilitate the ex post diversion of resources from failing to more promising areas of 
innovation. Both of these arguments suggest the existence of a direct channel through which 
board diversity influences the output of the firm innovation process. 
Another possibility is that board diversity helps foster an environment where firm-wide 
diversity is sought and cultivated. Board diversity would thus allow the development of a more 
diverse workforce, which previous research shows to be a key driver of the efficiency of the firm 
innovation processes (e.g., Gao and Zhang, 2014; Cao et al., 2016). This argument suggests an 
indirect channel whereby diversity among board members indirectly improves the efficiency of 
the firm innovation process due to spillover effects on firm-wide diversity. Although beyond the 
scope of our main analysis, we examine the basic implication of this argument in Table IA.6 of 
the Internet Appendix. Consistent with the intuition of this argument, we find that there is a 
strong positive (negative) association between diversity in the board and KLD’s assessment of 
the firm strengths (weaknesses) related to the diversity of the firm’s workforce. 
Overall, the evidence in this section shows that the persistence of corporate policies 
increases with the diversity of the firm’s directors and this effect is larger over longer horizons. 
Thus, consistent with moderated decision-making, board diversity leads to policies that are more 
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robust, which may at least partly explain its negative effect on stock volatility. Further tests point 
to additional channels through which policies adopted by diverse boards can affect volatility.22 
First, diverse boards adopt more conservative financial policies, which should reduce the risk 
borne by investors. Second, while diverse boards invest more in potentially riskier R&D, this 
behavior is justified by a higher efficiency (and thus lower risk) of the innovation activities 
associated with greater board diversity. 
5 Board Diversity and Performance 
While our results indicate that board diversity leads to lower firm risk because of less erratic 
corporate policies, lower financial risk-taking, and more efficient investments in innovation, 
heterogeneity in the board can be a double-edged sword. Indeed, diversity can lead to increased 
conflicts within groups (O’Reilly, Snyder, and Boothe, 1993; Smith, Smith, Olian, Sims, 
O’Bannon, and Scully, 1994), increased turnover in management teams, and slower reaction 
times to changing conditions (Hambrick et. al., 1996).23 Thus, it is not obvious what may be the 
net impact of board diversity on firm performance.  
Lower risk is not in and of itself desirable, if it comes at the expense of shareholder value. 
Although the evidence on the efficiency of firm innovation activities suggests otherwise, it is 
possible that diverse boards persistently adopt sub-optimal low risk policies that do not 
maximize firm value. Therefore, in this section, we directly examine whether the benefits 
                                                          
22 As shown in Table IA.7 and IA.8 of the Internet Appendix, we obtain similar results when we restrict our 
attention to the incremental diversity added to the board by non-executive directors. 
23 Table IA.9 of the Internet Appendix reports some evidence of these costs. Since conflicts inside the board are not 
observable, we use two coarse proxies to test whether board frictions increase with board diversity: board turnover 
rates and board meeting attendance propensity. While they provide no causal evidence, the OLS estimates in Table 
IA.9 show that there is a positive association between these proxies of board conflicts and board diversity. 
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accrued from board diversity outweigh its costs, on balance. To this end, we examine the effect 
of board diversity on both firm operating performance and asset valuation multiples.  
Table 11 reports the second stage IV estimates of models where the dependent variables are 
firm profitability (ratio of EBITDA to assets) and asset valuation multiples (log of asset market-
to book value).24 Similar to earlier tests, in the first stage, we instrument board diversity with the 
diversity of nonlocal potential directors residing a nonstop flight away from firm headquarters.  
The IV estimates in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 11 indicate that greater board diversity 
generates positive incremental net benefits that lead to greater profitability and higher valuations, 
respectively.25 The coefficient estimates on the instrumented board diversity are positive and 
significant at the 1% significance level, and the economic magnitude of the effects is large. A 
one standard deviation increase in instrumented board diversity is associated with an average 
increase in EBITDA-to-assets of two standard deviations, all else equal. The economic 
magnitude of the positive effect on market-to-book asset valuation multiples is similarly large.  
Given the net positive effects of diversity on firm performance, a natural question is why all 
firms would not adopt boards that are more diverse. One reason may be that some firms have 
limited access to a well-qualified pool of diverse directors. Our first stage IV estimates indeed 
suggest that board diversity depends on the diversity of the pool of directors available to the 
                                                          
24 Our earlier evidence shows that greater board diversity leads to more and better innovation. Hence, a positive 
relation between board diversity and asset market-to book ratios could reflect the larger weight of the value of 
growth options. This concern, however, does not apply to tests based on operating profitability, since this measure 
captures the income generating capacity of current assets-in-place – as opposed to future growth opportunities. 
25 This is in line with the results in Carter, Simkins, and Simpson (2003), which show a positive association between 
local demographic diversity and firm value. However, it is at odds with much of the finance literature on gender 
diversity, which finds either negative (e.g., Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Ahern and Dittmar, 2012) or no impact (e.g., 
Farrell and Hersch, 2005) of female directors on firm performance. 
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firm, both locally and within convenient flying routes. Thus, the headquarters location seems to 
create real barriers that prevent some firms from attaining greater board diversity. 
A second reason could be that diverse boards are less effective or even suboptimal in some 
circumstances. The evidence in Table 7 regarding the conditional effects of diversity on firm risk 
suggests this may be the case. Therefore, we conduct here a similar analysis with respect to the 
effects of board diversity on firm performance. Table 12 reports the second stage IV estimates of 
the relation between board diversity and performance conditional on the firm, board, and market-
wide factors examined in Table 7. Panel A and B summarize the results that we obtain for the 
performance models based on EBITDA-to-asset and asset market-to-book ratios, respectively. 
Although in Table 7 we find that the moderating effect of board diversity on firm risk varies 
with firm, board, and market-wide characteristics, the results in Table 11 imply that these 
incremental effects do not spill over onto the relation between diversity and firm performance, 
except in the case of market-wide volatility. Board diversity appears to have equally beneficial 
effects independent of the role of firm growth opportunities and board monitoring, in Columns 1-
2 and 4-5. Conversely, the beneficial effect of board diversity on firm performance is 15 to 20 
percent lower during periods of high market-wide volatility, in Column 3.  
It is telling that the effect of diversity on performance depends on market-wide time-series 
variation but not on arguably more predictable cross-sectional variation. Specifically, this 
evidence supports the idea that firms optimize the board composition vis-à-vis foreseeable firm 
level circumstances, whereas less predictable market conditions in which diversity may impede 
swift decisions by the board reduce the value of diversity among directors. 
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Overall, the evidence shows that greater aggregate board diversity is unconditionally 
beneficial in terms of firm performance.26 This is inconsistent with the notion that the reduction 
in firm risk associated with board diversity reflects suboptimal risk-taking. Nonetheless, we also 
find that the net benefits of diversity are significantly lower in more volatile market-wide 
conditions, when the board decision process may need to be more nimble and swift.  
6 Robustness Tests 
In this section, we discuss the results of a series of tests that we conduct to assess the 
robustness of our main results.  
6.1 Effect of Firm and Board Size 
The results in Table 2 show that firm and board sizes are the two strongest determinants of 
board diversity. Larger firms and larger boards tend to be also associated with lower return 
volatility. Although we control for both firm and board size in all specifications, one may still be 
concerned that our results are due to omitted non-linear effects of firm or board size on return 
volatility that may be correlated with board diversity. To address this concern, we expand our 
baseline models in several ways.  
First, we include indicators for each decile of firm and board size to account for potential 
non-linear relations between size and return volatility. Second, we include indicators for firm and 
board size decile-by-year combinations to account for the dynamic nature of firm and board size 
and any non-linear relation they may have with return volatility. Third, we include higher order 
polynomials (to the third degree) for firm and board size as independent variables. Fourth, we 
                                                          
26 As shown in Table IA.10 of the Internet Appendix, we obtain similar results when we restrict our attention to the 
incremental diversity added to the board by non-executive directors. 
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repeat our baseline tests while excluding in turn the smallest and largest firms/boards (i.e., 
extreme deciles). Fifth, since larger firms and bigger boards may be located in more-connected 
regions, we also repeat our analysis while excluding potential directors from the ten most-
connected cities. Lastly, we examine the interactive effect of board diversity and firm/board size.  
Tables IA.11 through IA.13 of the Internet Appendix report the results of these supplemental 
tests that control for nonlinear effects of firm and board size on our baseline results. Although 
the magnitude of the estimated effects of diversity on firm risk varies somewhat across the 
alternative specifications in those tables, our main inferences remain unaffected. Overall, we 
conclude that nonlinearities in the relation between firm or board size and return volatility cannot 
account for our baseline results for the effect of board diversity on firm risk. 
6.2 Alternative Demand-based IV – Board Diversity of Peer Firms 
To complement our main IV tests, we repeat our analysis using an alternative demand-based 
instrumental variable for board diversity. In particular, we use the average diversity of boards 
across firms that are in the same size quintile and industry (i.e., Fama-French 49) – excluding the 
firm in question. The economic intuition for this alternative IV is that peer-effects may lead firms 
to adopt similar board appointment practices. Carter et al. (2016) adopt a similar demand-based 
IV approach, using the industry average fraction of female directors to instrument for the fraction 
of female directors serving on a firm’s board. 
While it seems reasonable (and the empirical evidence confirms) that the alternative IV 
satisfies the relevance condition, it is less clear that it may be safe to assume it satisfies the 
required exclusion restriction. In particular, it is sensible that similarities in the risk profiles of 
similar firms lead them to choose similar optimal board compositions. If so, the resulting IV 
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estimates would be biased in the same direction as the OLS estimates – albeit possibly less so. 
Therefore, we use this alternative IV estimation approach only to validate the broad inferences 
we draw from our baseline analysis.  
Panels A-E of Table IA.14 in the Internet Appendix report the results of the tests based on 
the alternative demand-based IV for board diversity. In particular, we revisit the effect of the 
instrumented board diversity on stock return volatility in Panel A, corporate financial and 
investment policies in Panels B and C, innovation output and quality in Panel D, and firm 
operating performance and asset valuation multiples in Panel E.  
The supplemental evidence from the demand-based IV estimation is largely in line with the 
results from our baseline approach. Yet, the magnitude of the effects of board diversity based on 
the alternative IV tend to be smaller than our baseline estimates, which may be due to violations 
of the exclusion restriction resulting in an endogeneity bias similar to the OLS estimates. 
6.3 Alternative Diversity Index Construction - Principal Components Analysis 
In our main analysis, we construct the diversity index using a simple and intuitive 
aggregation method. This parametric approach is transparent and easy to interpret. However, the 
weights of the index components are not designed to maximize the components’ common 
variation captured by the index. Principal Components Analysis (PCA) is a viable alternative 
method to achieve that objective. This statistical procedure by design assigns weights to each 
dimension to maximize the common variation captured by the principal components. This 
benefit comes at the cost of transparency and objective interpretation of the identified common 
factors. Nonetheless, for robustness, we examine whether constructing a board diversity index 
based on PCA analysis affects our earlier inferences.  
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Table IA.15 in the Internet Appendix reports the results of the PCA analysis. The evidence 
in Panel A shows that five of our six diversity measures load on the first principal component in 
a way that suggests lower (greater) board diversity (homogeneity) for higher values of the 
component. While with the reverse sign and except for the inconsistent effect of director age, this 
is consistent with our aggregation in the construction of the board diversity index. The results in 
Panel B indicate that the first principal component captures a large portion of the common 
variation across the six diversity measures (i.e., almost 29%) and has an eigenvalue substantially 
higher than one. Thus, this component seems to provide a reasonable summary measure of the 
common variation in the different dimensions of board diversity that we use in our baseline 
index.  
In Panels A-E of Table IA.16 in the Internet Appendix, we replicate our main tests while 
using the PCA first principal component multiplied by minus one. We adopt this transformation 
for ease of interpretation, so that the component can be reasonably interpreted as a measure of 
board diversity. Panel A reports the estimates for the stock volatility models, Panels B and C for 
the corporate policies models, Panel D for the innovation output models, and Panel E for the firm 
performance models. 
Across the board, the PCA-based results in Table IA.16 confirm our index-based evidence. 
In all of the panels, both the signs as well as the economic magnitudes of the estimated effects of 
board diversity are in line with the baseline results discussed in previous sections. If anything, 
the statistical significance of the estimated effects increases uniformly when we impose no 
predetermined weighting scheme.  
Overall, the evidence from the tests in this section demonstrates that our earlier inferences 
are robust to variations in model specifications, IV selection, and aggregation of the multiple 
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dimensions of board diversity. In particular, our results are not due to spurious correlations of 
firm and board sizes with both board diversity and firm risk. Our inferences do not change when 
we adopt a demand-based IV approach to estimate the causal effect of board diversity on firm 
risk, as opposed to our preferred supply-based instrument. Lastly, we obtain similar results 
whether we aggregate the various dimensions of diversity into an index using predetermined 
weights or more sophisticated statistical techniques. 
7 Conclusion 
Today, almost every organization in the U.S promotes diversity. Private, government, and 
educational institutions all strive to achieve diversity in their workforces, management teams, 
representatives, educators, and student bodies. However, there is ample research suggesting that 
diversity has both costs and benefits. We investigate the role of diversity in corporate boards, an 
area in which many countries have recently introduced mandated minimum levels of diversity. In 
particular, we examine the effects that board diversity has on the risk, policies, and performance 
of firms that these boards monitor and advise. 
We find that diversity in the board of directors reduces stock return volatility, which is 
consistent with diverse backgrounds working as a governance mechanism, moderating decisions, 
and alleviating problems associated with “groupthink.” When we shift our focus on corporate 
policies, we find that firms with diverse boards tend to adopt policies that are more stable and 
persistent, consistent with the board decisions being less subject to idiosyncrasies. Moreover, 
while diverse boards are less prone to take on financial risk, this behavior does not carry over 
onto real risk-taking activities. Indeed, consistent with the idea that diverse backgrounds are 
optimal when creative solutions are needed, we find that firms with diverse boards invest more in 
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R&D and these investments are more productive, leading to greater and higher quality 
innovation output. 
Diverse boards do come with some cost, however. In particular, the response times of 
diverse groups tends to be slower than more homogenous groups. This can be detrimental when 
firms must react quickly to new information. Consistent with this, we find that the benefits of 
board diversity are lower during times of high aggregate volatility.  
When assessing the net benefits of board diversity, we find that greater heterogeneity among 
directors leads to both higher profitability and firm valuations, on average. This supports the 
view that diversity should be promoted – albeit perhaps not imposed, not only from a social 
perspective, but also from an economic perspective – at least in the context of corporate boards. 
We recognize, however, that our estimates reflect average effects of board diversity and thus in 
some contexts the costs of diversity likely outweigh its benefits. This may be true, for example, 
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Appendix A – Details about the Construction and Relevance of the Instrumental Variable: 
Diversity of Nonlocal Director Supply Accessible via Non-Stop Flights 
To construct our main instrumental variable, we collect data on the geographic distribution of 
domiciles of potential directors. Since the entire pool of potential directors is not observable, we 
use the population of individuals serving or having served as actual directors or executives of all 
other S&P 1,500 firms in the same size quintile in a given year as a proxy for the pool of 
directors potentially available to a firm. The underlying assumption is that the geographic 
distribution of the characteristics of board members and executives we identify reflects that of 
the potential director pool.27 Then, we define as nonlocal potential directors those who reside in 
counties that are at least 150 miles away from the firm headquarters county.  
To collect potential director domicile information, we perform “people searches” using 
the LexisNexis Public Records Database for the union of all individuals who are either directors 
included in the RiskMetrics database or executives included in the ExecuComp database for non-
financial, non-utility firms for the years 1996 to 2014. LexisNexis public records database 
gathers data from numerous sources including mortgage records, deed transfers, tax assessment 
records, driver’s license records, voter registrations, and social security administration records to 
                                                          
27 Conceptually, the true set of potential directors that reside at a particular location at a given point in time should 
fall somewhere in the continuum between the superset of all individuals of working age residing at the location and 
the subset of all individuals residing at the location and currently serving as directors. The larger set overestimates 
the supply of potential directors available from the particular location because not all individuals in that location are 
viable directors. Conversely, the latter subset will underestimate the supply of potential directors available from the 
particular location because not all individuals who are potentially viable directors in fact serve (e.g., a university 
professor with relevant expertise). Our approach produces a set that is somewhere on that continuum. We believe 






construct a profile for each individual. Included in each profile is a historical list of addresses 
with relevant dates for the individual. After removing addresses associated with post office boxes 
and places of work, we use the zip codes from these addresses along with the dates to construct a 
time series of zip code-level locations for each individual uniquely identified in the LexisNexis 
database. After creating these time series, we merge them back with the RiskMetrics and 
ExecuComp datasets. 
Our search and collection methods follow those outlined in Yonker (2016), and Pool, 
Stoffman, and Yonker (2015). Yonker (2016) collects social security registration information on 
executives, while Pool, et. al. (2015) collects address information for mutual fund managers. The 
probability of a unique match in LexisNexis increases with the amount of information that 
researchers have on individuals. Information, such as age, a unique first or last name, or middle 
initial all increase the likelihood of uniquely identifying executives/directors. 
There are 40,081 unique individuals who are executives and/or directors included in these 
databases during our sample period. At least one residential address is identified for 82% of 
director/executive-year observations. In total, we identify residential zip codes for 383,895 
director/executive-year observations.  
In addition to the geographic distribution of potential directors, we require airline route 
data to construct our main instrumental variable. Following Giroud (2013, 2015), we obtain 
airline routes data from the T-100 Domestic Segment Database for the period 1995 to 2014, 
which is compiled from Form 41 of the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) and includes 
all flights that have taken place between any two airports in the U.S.28 The database contains 
                                                          




monthly data for each airline and route (segment) including origin and destination airports, flight 
duration (ramp-to-ramp time), scheduled departures, performed departures, number of 
passengers, and aircraft type.  
We use the T-100 data to count the number of non-stop flights connecting any two U.S. 
counties in each month between 1995 and 2014. In particular, we begin by identifying all 
airports within a 50-mile radius of each U.S. county population-weighted centroid. Then, for 
each pair of counties whose population-weighted centroids are at least 150 miles apart, we count 
the number of monthly direct flights connecting the airport pairs associated with each county 
pair. Lastly, to weight the supply of non-local directors available to the firm, we calculate the 
average number of monthly flights connecting each county pair in each calendar year. 
Lastly, we merge the county pair-level monthly measure of non-stop flight connections 
with the data on director residence described above as well as firm headquarters’ counties based 
on zip codes from the CRSP-Compustat historical header file corrected for headquarters changes. 
Our instrument is ultimately defined as the weighted diversity (based on our index) of all 
nonlocal potential directors in the U.S. who reside in a county with at least one daily non-stop 
flight between the director residence and the firm headquarters. Specifically, we weight the 
potential director-firm-year observation by the average number of monthly non-stop flights 
between the director-firm county pairs in the given year.  
A.2 Empirical Evidence: Non-Stop Flight Connections and Firm-Director Matching 
The conceptual premise of our IV approach is that the existence and intensity of non-stop 
airline routes between director domiciles and firm headquarters directly affects the geographic 
composition of the firm’s board. As a result, the firm’s ease of access to the supply nonlocal 
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directors and its diversity would determine the diversity of the firm’s actual board. In the spirit of 
KKM this link rests on the assumption that directors are more likely to serve on boards of firms 
that entail lower personal travel costs and thus, if a non-stop flight exists between the firm 
headquarters and a potential director domicile, that individual should be more likely to serve as a 
director on the firm board. Here, we explicitly examine this hypothesized channel: are 
individuals in fact more likely to serve as directors of a firm if non-stop flights connect their 
domicile and the firm headquarters locations?  
To answer this question, we estimate the following model, with a county pair-year as the unit 
of observation: 
Yijt = β1 (Nit)+ β2 (Nit × Dij) + β3 (Nit× Dij× Fijt)+ β4 (Dij× Fijt)+β5 (Fijt)+ γXit +λij + λt +ε, (2) 
where Yijt is equal to the log of one plus the number of individuals living in county i and serving 
as directors of firms headquartered in county j during year t, Nit is the log of one plus the number 
of individuals from county i serving as directors and/or executives to any firm during year t, Dij 
is an indicator equal to one if the population-weighted centroid of county i is more than 150 
miles away from that of county j, Fijt is log of one plus the average number of non-stop flights 
during a month between counties i and j in year t, Xit is a vector of average of time-varying 
characteristics of firms headquartered in county j during year t, λij is a county-pair fixed effect, 
and λt is a year fixed effect. 
We also conduct a similar analysis while using the firm-county-year as the unit of 
observation to estimate the following model: 
Yijkt = β1(Nit)+ β2(Nit×Dij)+ β3(Nit×Dij× Fijt)+ β4 (Dij× Fijt)+ β5(Fijt)+γXkt+λij+ λk +λt +ε, (3)  
where Yijkt is equal to the log of one plus the number of individuals living in county i and serving 
as directors of firm k headquartered in county j during year t, Xkt is a vector of time-varying firm 
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characteristics during year t, λk is a firm fixed effects, and all other variables are the same as 
defined in Equation (2). 
Naturally, we expect β1 > 0. Similar to KKM we also expect that individuals are less likely to 
serve as directors of firms headquartered farther than a reasonable driving distance (i.e., β2 < 0). 
However, crucial for the premise of our IV approach, we posit that non-stop flight connectivity 
between firm and director locations should temper the effect of physical distance (i.e., β3 > 0).  
Table A.1 presents the results of these tests. Columns 1 and 2 report OLS estimates of the 
county pair-level model, with standard errors clustered by county-pair. Columns 3 and 4 report 
estimates of the firm-level model, with standard errors clustered by firm.  
The evidence in the table provides strong support for our main conjectures. The estimated 
coefficient on Nit is positive and significant. Hence, the number of directors who reside in county 
i and serve in county j (firm k) increases with the supply of potential directors residing in county 
i. However, physical distance between the firm headquarters county and the potential director 
domicile county (Dij) greatly reduces the strength of this relation, as indicated by the negative 
coefficient on the interaction between Dij and Nij. In other words, controlling for the supply of 
potential directors hailing from a particular county, individuals are significantly less likely to 
serve as directors of firms whose headquarters are beyond a reasonable driving distance (150 
miles) from the potential director domicile.  
Crucial to the conceptual underpinning of our instrumental variable, we find that the 
coefficient on the triple interaction between non-stop flight connectivity (Fijt), Dij and Nij is 
positive and statistically significant. Therefore, physical distance between firm headquarters and 
director domiciles becomes increasingly less important as non-stop flight connectivity between 
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those locations increases. In other words, non-stop flight connectivity between director domiciles 
and firm headquarters increases the likelihood of a firm-director match. The economic 
magnitude of this effect is also quite meaningful. For the average director-county and firm-
county pair, a one standard deviation increase in the number of non-stop flights is associated 
with a ten-fold increase in the number of directors that serve on boards of firms headquartered in 
the given county. This large effect is partly due to the sparsity of director-populated counties. 
Yet, the economic magnitude is relatively large even for counties that are heavily populated with 
directors (i.e., at one standard deviation above the mean). For these counties, a one standard 
deviation increase in the availability of non-stop flights connecting to the firm headquarters 
increase the number of director-firm matches by roughly 25 percent.  
Overall, the evidence in Table A.1 provides strong support to the notion that personal travel 
costs of a potential director affect the likelihood that the individual will serve on a firm board. 
Importantly, the results are consistent with the conjecture that the availability of direct flight 
connections reduces such personal costs and ultimately affects the actual composition of the 
board. Therefore, consistent with the premise of our IV approach, it is reasonable that variation 
in the diversity of nonlocal potential directors accessible via non-stop flights would affect the 




Appendix Table A.1  
This table reports OLS estimates of models where the dependent variable is in the column title. In 
columns (1) and (2), each observation is a (firm HQ county i, director county j, year t) combination. In 
columns (3) and (4), each observation is a (firm k, firm HQ county i, director county j, year t) 
combination. Firm-level control variables, e.g., Ln(Assets), are firm HQ county level means in column 
(2). Number County Directors (Njt) is the number of directors from county j who serve on any firm board 
in our sample in year t. Distant County (D) is an indicator equal to 1 if the director county is more than 
150 miles away from the firm HQ county. Number Flightsijt (Fijt) is the log of one plus the mean number 
of monthly non-stop flights between the firm HQ county i and director county j in year t. All models 
include fixed effects for years as well as firm-county and director-county pairs. Models 3 and 4 also 
include firm fixed effects. In all models, standard errors are clustered by firm-county and director-county 
pair. The corresponding t-statistics are in parenthesis. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
  HQ County-Director Residence County Firm-Director Residence County 
Dependent Variable: Ln(1+# of County j Directors  Serving in County i in Year t) 
Ln(1+# of County j Directors  
Serving in Firm k-County i in Year t) 
Number County Directors (Njt) 0.5607*** 0.5605*** 0.4289*** 0.4299*** 
 (0.0135) (0.0135) (0.0096) (0.0096) N × Distant County (D) -0.4115*** -0.4111*** -0.3642*** -0.3651*** 
 (0.0139) (0.0139) (0.0098) (0.0098) N × D × Number Flights (Fijt) 0.0295*** 0.0294*** 0.0117*** 0.0115*** 
 (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0017) (0.0017) D×Fijt 0.0069*** 0.0067*** 0.0044*** 0.0041*** 
 (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0013) (0.0013) Fijt 0.1473*** 0.1128*** 0.0323*** 0.0344*** 
 (0.0028) (0.0040) (0.0025) (0.0025) Size of Director Pool 0.0253*** 0.0607*** 0.0625*** 0.0670*** 






















































Ln(No. of Firms) 
 
0.0525*** 
    
(0.0054) 
  Firm FE No No Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-county×director-county FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 838,928 838,662 4,663,744 4,654,695 
R-squared 0.6855 0.6856 0.2183 0.2189 
Predicted Y At means 0.000679 0.000783 -0.000296 -0.000228 
 At (F+σf, N) 0.00758 0.00748 0.00406 0.00388 
 At (F, N+ σn) 0.150 0.150 0.0644 0.0646 
 At (F+ σf, N+ σn) 0.186 0.186 0.0805 0.0802 
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Appendix B – Variables Definitions 
Variable Name Definition 
Daily Total Volatility (%) Square root of 252 multiplied by the standard deviation of daily stock returns. 
Daily Idiosyncratic Volatility (%) 
Square root of 252 multiplied by the standard 
deviation of daily excess stock returns. Excess 
return is defined using a CAPM market model 
estimated over the prior year. 
Monthly Total Volatility (%) Square root of 12 multiplied by the standard deviation of monthly stock returns. 
Monthly Idiosyncratic Volatility (%) 
Square root of 12 multiplied by the standard 
deviation of monthly excess stock returns. Excess 
return is defined using a CAPM market model 
estimated over the prior year. 
Female Board Member Ratio Number of female directors divided by board size. 
Standard Deviation Age Standard deviation of the ages of the board members. 
HHI Bachelors 
Herfindahl index of the number of directors in each 
firm-year that are classified in categories by their 
Bachelor’s granting institution. For example, 3 
directors that are Harvard alums and 4 directors that 
are Yale alums would be defined as (3/7)2 + (4/7)2 
HHI Ethnicity 
Herfindahl index of the number of directors in each 
firm-year that are classified in categories by 
ethnicity, as defined in Risk Metrics. Risk Metrics’ 
ethnic categories are Asian, African-American, 
Caucasian, Hispanic, and Native American.  
HHI Financial Expert 
Herfindahl index of the number of directors in each 
firm-year that are classified as having financial 
expertise or not having financial expertise. 
Mean No. of Other Boards For each firm-year, the mean number of other boards on which current directors serve. 
Board Diversity Index 
For each firm-year, this index is computed as 
(Female Board Member Ratio) + (1 – HHI Age) + 
(1-HHI Bachelors) + (1 – HHI Ethnicity) + (1 – HHI 
Financial Expert) + Mean No. of Other Boards 
Non-Executive ΔDiversity Index 
For each firm-year, this index is computed as the 
difference between the Board Diversity Index and 
the Board Executives Diversity Index  
Book Assets ($M) Book assets as reported in Compustat. 
Ln(Assets) Natural log of book assets. 
M/B Market equity divided by book equity 
Mkt. Leverage Sum of long-term debt and current liabilities divided by the sum of market equity and book debt. 
Asset Tangibility Sum of investments and net PP&E divided by book assets. 
Cash/Assets Cash and short-term equivalents divided by book assets. 
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Firm Pays Dividends Indicator equal to 1 if the firm pays dividends in the current year, and 0 otherwise. 
ROA Net income divided by book equity 
R&D/Assets R&D expense (set to 0 if missing) divided by book assets. 
Board Size Number of board of directors for the firm in the current year. 
Avg. Board Age Average age of the board of directors for the firm in the current year. 
Firm Age Number of years since the firm’s IPO. 
CEO Tenure Number of years since the current CEO’s starting date. 
CEO is Chair and President Indicator equal to 1 if the CEO is also the Chair and President of the board of directors. 
CEO General Ability Index The general ability index of the CEO is from Custodio et. al. (2013).  
County Population Population of the firm’s headquarters county in the current year. 
%∆ County Population 
Percent change in the population of the firm’s 
headquarters county from the prior to the current 
year. 
County Per Capita Income Per capita income of the firm’s headquarters county in the current year. 
%∆ County Per Capita Income 
Percent change in the per capita income of the 
firm’s headquarters county from the prior to the 
current year. 
% Clear Days Percent of annual days that are not cloudy, as defined in Yonker (2016). 
Diversity of Local Directors 
Board Diversity Index of all the individuals that 
serve as directors at any firm in the current year and 
reside within 150 miles of the firm’s headquarter. 
Number of Patents Number of patents granted to the firm that were applied for in the current year. 
Patents/R&D Number of Patents divided by R&D expense 
Total Citations 
Total number of citations until 2013 for all patents 
granted to the firm that were applied for in the 
current year. 
Citations/Patent Total Citations divided by Number of Patents 
EBITDA/Assets EBITDA divided by book assets 





  Figure 1 
The figure displays the average value of the diversity index of firm
s headquartered in each state. A
verages are based on firm
 year 
observations over the entire sam




 year observations are set to m
issing (show
n in black). 
C
onstruction of the index is detailed in the data section of the text. 
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Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A reports summary statistics for various firm-level time-varying characteristics. All variable 
definitions are in the Data Appendix. Panel B reports the simple correlations between the components of 
board diversity. 
Panel A  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Mean Std. Dev. Median 25
th Pct. 75th Pct. 
Daily Total Volatility (%) 43.155 22.432 37.391 27.809 52.253 
Daily Idiosyncratic Volatility (%) 37.701 20.124 32.948 23.867 46.035 
Monthly Total Volatility (%) 39.065 23.302 33.268 23.537 47.717 
Monthly Idiosyncratic Volatility (%) 36.274 21.734 30.904 21.737 44.906 
Female Board Member Ratio 0.104 0.098 0.1 0 0.167 
STDEV Age 7.774 2.462 7.436 6.009 9.223 
HHI Bachelors 0.372 0.287 0.25 0.167 0.5 
HHI Ethnicity 0.483 0.132 0.46 0.389 0.551 
HHI Financial Expert 0.587 0.107 0.556 0.51 0.625 
Mean No. of Other Boards 0.771 0.622 0.7 0.273 1.143 
Board Diversity Index 0 1 0.113 -0.622 0.71 
Book Assets ($M) 15,195.83 80,247.26 2,053.98 744.708 7,001.395 
Ln(Assets) 7.816 1.653 7.628 6.613 8.854 
M/B 1.886 1.613 1.43 1.109 2.093 
Mkt. Leverage 0.171 0.157 0.136 0.042 0.262 
Net Mkt. Leverage 0.071 1.156 0.079 -0.036 0.219 
Net Book Leverage 0.024 0.619 0.133 -0.082 0.303 
Asset Tangibility 0.378 0.253 0.364 0.161 0.57 
Cash/Assets 0.13 0.16 0.063 0.021 0.18 
Firm Pays Dividends 0.636 0.481 1 0 1 
Dividends/Equity 0.168 3.88 0.094 0 0.241 
Capex/Assets 0.048 0.053 0.033 0.014 0.063 
ROA 0.046 0.17 0.048 0.014 0.093 
R&D/Assets 0.026 0.051 0 0 0.028 
Board Size 9.658 2.817 9 8 11 
Avg. Board Age 59.697 4.023 59.909 57.375 62.2 
Firm Age 24.949 19.312 20 10 34 
CEO Tenure 7.12 7.244 5 2 10 
CEO is Chair and President 0.252 0.434 0 0 1 
County Population 1,431,492 1,816,724 891,764 494,748 1,562,154 
%∆ County Population 0.008 0.015 0.006 0.001 0.013 
County Per Capital Income 44,216.02 15,502.17 40,485 34,043 49,936 
%∆ County Per Capital Income 0.041 0.047 0.042 0.018 0.068 
Diversity of Local Directors 0 0.859 0 -0.079 0.501 
Number of Patents 21.558 140.97 0 0 2 
Patents/R&D 0.009 0.116 0.002 0 0.009 
Total Citations 168.434 1617.391 0 0 3 
Citations/Patent 1.984 6.89 0 0 0.6 
Patent Originality 0.369 0.181 0.375 0.268 0.480 
EBITDA/Assets 0.13 0.102 0.126 0.078 0.182 
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Q 1.91 1.608 1.459 1.139 2.114 
% Directors Attend <75% Meetings 1.41 4.41 0 0 4.15 
Board 3-Year Turnover Rate (%) 52.77 38.34 66.66 0 85.71 
 
Panel B 
   Panel B N(% Female) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(1) N(STDEV Age) -0.119      
(2) - N(HHI Ethnicity) -0.009 0.013     
(3) - N(HHI Bachelors) 0.164 -0.157 0.056    
(4) - N(HHI Financial Expert) 0.025 -0.057 0.008 0.051   
(5) N(Mean # of Other Boards) 0.124 -0.187 -0.033 0.269 -0.003  





Table 2 – Which boards are diverse? 
This table reports OLS regression estimates of models where the dependent variable is the Diversity Index 
of the firm's board of directors in the current year. All models include industry (Fama-French 49), 
headquarters county, and year fixed effects. All standard errors are clustered at the firm-level. The 
corresponding t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. 
  (1) (2) 
   Ln(Assets) 0.292*** 0.279*** 
 (15.869) (14.877) 
M/B 0.039*** 0.039*** 
 (2.767) (2.775) 
Mkt. Lev. -0.014 -0.014 
 (-0.937) (-0.884) 
Tangibility -0.034 -0.028 
 (-1.456) (-1.192) 
Cash/Asset -0.000 -0.007 
 (-0.018) (-0.397) 
I(Dividend Paying) 0.012 0.015 
 (0.742) (0.948) 
ROA 0.029** 0.030** 
 (2.458) (2.518) 
(R&D/Assets) 0.075*** 0.069*** 
 
(3.938) (3.615) 
Ln(1+Firm Age) 0.042** 0.041** 
 
(2.450) (2.419) 
Ln (Board Size) 0.217*** 0.220*** 
 (11.491) (11.737) 
Ln(Average Board Age) -0.057*** -0.060*** 
 (-3.454) (-3.620) 
Ln(1+CEO Tenure) -0.023* -0.025* 
 
(-1.751) (-1.836) 
CEO is Chair and President 0.022* 0.023** 
 
(1.960) (2.104) 
County Per Capita Income Growth  -0.032*** 
  (-3.499) 
County Population Growth  -0.015 
  (-1.311) 
Ln(County Per Capita Income)  0.057*** 
  (2.939) 
Ln(County Population)  0.021 
 
 (1.314) 
Industry (FF49) Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
HQ County Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Observations 21,572 21,572 
R-squared 0.319 0.322 
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Table 3 – Board diversity and stock return volatility 
This table reports regression estimates of models where the dependent variable is the annualized standard 
deviation of the firm’s daily stock returns. The Board Diversity Index is normalized by its sample mean 
and standard deviation. Column (1) reports ordinary least square (OLS) estimates for the model that 
includes industry (Fama-French 49), headquarters county, and year fixed effects, while column (2) reports 
OLS estimates for the model with firm and year fixed effects. Columns (3) and (4) report 1st and 2nd stage 
IV regression estimates obtained when the board diversity is instrumented with the diversity of potential 
directors who reside more than 150 miles away but within a non-stop flight of the firm headquarters. All 
standard errors are clustered at the firm level and account for the two-stage nature of the estimation in 
column (4). The corresponding t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 





     Board Diversity Index -0.799*** -0.630**   
 (-4.080) (-2.317)   Instrumented Diversity Index    -23.891** 
    (-2.531) Diversity of Nonlocal Directors  
w/in Non-Stop Flight 
  0.050***  
  (2.835)  
     
Diversity of Local Directors -0.623*** -0.110 0.062*** 0.916 
 (-3.455) (-0.559) (4.999) (1.319) 
Ln(Assets) -2.406*** -5.239*** 0.239*** 3.688 
 (-7.945) (-5.535) (11.535) (1.457) M/B 1.092*** 1.094*** 0.022* 1.754*** 
 (3.901) (3.316) (1.833) (3.581) Mkt. Lev. 2.998*** 3.833*** -0.010 2.623*** 
 (9.157) (9.190) (-0.658) (5.578) Tangibility 1.013*** 1.554** 0.007 1.156* 
 (3.205) (2.193) (0.286) (1.826) Cash/Asset 2.420*** 1.213*** -0.007 2.266*** 
 (9.739) (3.277) (-0.399) (4.880) I(Dividend Paying) -2.477*** -1.706*** 0.005 -2.363*** 
 (-11.091) (-5.030) (0.285) (-5.454) ROA -4.663*** -2.573*** 0.023** -4.098*** 
 (-4.297) (-3.887) (2.066) (-3.989) (R&D/Assets) 1.027*** -0.271 0.066*** 2.578*** 
 (2.729) (-0.512) (3.636) (2.983) Ln(1+Firm Age) -1.445*** -5.647*** 0.036** -0.610 
 (-6.496) (-6.292) (2.078) (-1.067) Ln (Board Size) -1.071*** -1.536*** 0.211*** 3.793* 
 (-4.788) (-4.862) (11.235) (1.863) Ln(Average Board Age) -1.388*** -1.447*** -0.052*** -2.591*** 
 (-6.914) (-4.709) (-3.102) (-4.026) Ln(1+CEO Tenure) -0.414** -0.117 -0.026** -1.017** 
 
(-2.310) (-0.601) (-2.101) (-2.419) 
CEO is Chair and President -0.080 0.224 0.018* 0.329 
 
(-0.525) (1.356) (1.714) (1.006) 
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County Per Capita Income 
Growth 
-0.052 -0.022 -0.023** -0.592 
(-0.198) (-0.095) (-2.430) (-1.493) 
County Population Growth -0.279 -0.203 0.002 -0.224 
 (-1.625) (-1.264) (0.249) (-0.833) 
Ln(County Per Capita Income) 4.631*** 5.205*** 0.035 5.471** 
 (3.727) (3.665) (0.422) (2.402) 
Ln(County Population) -3.882 1.278 -0.178 -7.547 
 (-1.171) (0.310) (-0.775) (-1.159) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry (FF-49) FE Yes No Yes Yes 
HQ County FE Yes No Yes Yes 
Firm FE No Yes No No 
Observations 21,572 21,572 21,572 21,572 
R-squared 0.600 0.745 0.391 0.468 
IV F-stat    23.82 
Durbin p-val.    < 0.001 
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Table 4 – Instrumented Change in Board Diversity and Changes in Firm Volatility 
This table reports IV regression estimates of models where the dependent variable in the 1st stage is the 
change in board diversity over a 3-year window and the dependent variable in the 2nd stage is the change 
in firm stock volatility over the same 3-year window. The change in board diversity is instrumented with 
the change in diversity of potential directors who reside more than 150 miles away due to changes in non-
stop flights from the firm headquarters. All models include industry (Fama-French 49), headquarters 
county, and year fixed effects, along with all time-varying control variables from Table 3. All standard 
errors are clustered at the firm level and account for the two-stage nature of the estimation. The 
corresponding t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. 






   
Instrumented Change in Board Diversity  -5.360**  (-1.964) 
   Change in Nonlocal potential Director Diversity 
due to Changes in Non-Stop Flight Routes 
0.082**  
(2.342)  
Firm, CEO, Board, and HQ County Controls Yes Yes 
   HQ County, Industry (FF-49), and Year FE Yes Yes 
Observations 14,786 14,786 
R-squared 0.172 0.515 
IV F-stat  17.23 




Table 5 – Which diversity matters for return volatility?  
This table reports regression estimates of models where the dependent variable is the annualized standard 
deviation of the firm’s daily stock returns. Panel A reports 2nd stage IV estimates obtained when we 
instrument each normalized component of the diversity index with the corresponding diversity of the 
potential directors who reside more than 150 miles away but within a non-stop flight of the firm 
headquarters. Panel B reports 2nd stage IV estimates obtained by excluding each component of the 
diversity index in turn and instrumenting the restricted normalized diversity index with the corresponding 
diversity index of nonlocal potential directors residing within a non-stop flight of the firm headquarters. 
Panel C reports OLS (columns (1-2)) and IV (columns (3-6)) estimates obtained when grouping the six 
measures of diversity in two separate indexes. Demographic Diversity is calculated using demographic 
characteristics of the directors: percent female, standard deviation of age, and HHI ethnicity. Cognitive 
Diversity is calculated using cognitive characteristics of the directors: HHI bachelors, HHI financial 
expert, and other board experience. Demographic Diversity and Cognitive Diversity are normalized by 
their sample mean and standard deviation. All models include industry (Fama-French 49), headquarters 
county, and year fixed effects, along with all time-varying control variables from Table 3. All standard 
errors are clustered at the firm level and account for the two-stage nature of the estimation where 
appropriate. The corresponding t-statistics are in parenthesis. 
Panel A: 2nd Stage IV Estimates using Individual Components of the Diversity Index 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Instrumented (% Female) -1.351*      
 (-1.955)      
Instrumented (STDEV Age)  -5.734     
  (-0.296)     Instrumented - (HHI Ethnicity)   -2.092    
   (-0.596)    
Instrumented - (HHI Bachelors)    -1.631   
    (-0.352)   
Instrumented - (HHI Fin. Expertise)     0.210  
     (0.518)  Instrumented (Num. Boards)      0.869 
      (1.372) 
Firm, CEO, Board, and  
HQ County Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
HQ County, Industry (FF-49),  
and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 21,572 21,572 21,572 21,572 21,572 21,572 








Panel B: 2nd Stage IV Estimates using Restricted Diversity Index 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
Instrumented Diversity  
Index excl. Female 
-23.530***      (-2.790)      Instrumented Diversity  
Index excl. Age  
-22.899***     
 (-2.897)     Instrumented Diversity  
Index excl. Ethnicity   
-21.066***    
  (-3.030)    Instrumented Diversity  
Index excl.Bachelors    
-24.546*   
   (-1.852)   Instrumented Diversity  
Index excl. Fin. Expertise     
-24.526***  
    (-2.789)  Instrumented Diversity  
Index excl Num. Boards      
-26.159*** 
     (-2.581) Firm, CEO, Board, and 
County Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
HQ County, Industry 
(FF-49), and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 21,572 21,572 21,572 21,572 21,572 21,572 
R-squared 0.165 0.162 0.163 0.164 0.161 0.160 
IV F-stat 21.12 33.74 31.18 14.834 21.59 13.86 
Durbin pval <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Panel C: 2nd Stage IV Estimates using Cognitive and Demographic Diversity Indexes 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 







       Demographic Diversity (DD) -0.211**      
 (-2.058)      Cognitive Diversity (CD)  -0.350***     
  (-3.619)     
Nonlocal Directors DD   0.022***    
   (2.671)    Instrumented DD    -6.713   
    (-1.221)   Nonlocal Directors CD 
 
    0.095***  
    (5.219)  
Instrumented CD      -3.351** 
      (-2.456) Firm, CEO, Board, and  
HQ County Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
HQ County, Industry  
(FF-49), and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 21,572 21,572 21,572 21,572 21,572 21,572 
R-squared 0.600 0.600 0.217 0.397 0.451 0.550 
IV F-stat    25.28  39.36 




Table 6 – Whose diversity matters? Diversity Added by Non-Executive versus Executive Directors 
This table reports OLS and IV regression estimates of models where the dependent variable is the 
annualized standard deviation of the firm’s daily stock returns and aggregate board diversity is broken 
into the diversity added to the board by non-executive (columns (1-3)) and executive (columns (4-6)) 
directors. Executive (non-executive) directors are the members of the board who are (not) also executives 
of the same firm. Each measure of board diversity is instrumented with the diversity of potential directors 
who reside more than 150 miles away but within a non-stop flight of the firm headquarters. All models 
include industry (Fama-French 49), headquarters county, and year fixed effects, along with all time-
varying control variables from Table 3. All standard errors are clustered at the firm level and account for 
the two-stage nature of the estimation where appropriate. The corresponding t-statistics are in parenthesis.  
 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) 










       Diversity Added by  
Non-Executive Directors 
-0.726***      (-5.76)             Diversity of Nonlocal Directors  
w/in Non-Stop Flight 
 0.039**      (2.019)            Instrumented Diversity Added 
by Non-Executives Directors 
  -30.515*      (-1.851)           Diversity Added by  
Executives Directors 
   -0.223**      (-2.28)          Diversity of Nonlocal Directors  
w/in Non-Stop Flight 
    0.027      (1.148)         Instrumented Diversity Added 
 by Executives Directors 
     -45.372      (-1.153) Firm, CEO, Board, and  
HQ County Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
HQ County, Industry  
(FF-49), and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 21,572 21,572 21,572 21,572 21,572 21,572 
R-squared 0.603 0.186 0.322 0.592 0.105 0.331 
IV F-stat   15.44   4.297 






Table 7 – When does diversity matter more? Conditional effects on return volatility 
This table reports 2nd stage IV regression estimates of models where the dependent variable is the 
annualized standard deviation of the firm’s daily stock returns Diversity Index and its interaction with the 
indicator variables are instrumented with the diversity of potential directors who reside more than 150 
miles away but within a non-stop flight of the firm headquarters. All models include industry (Fama-
French 49), headquarters county, and year fixed effects, along with all time-varying control variables 
from Table 3. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and account for the two-stage nature of the 
estimation. The corresponding t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Instrumented Diversity Index -22.460** -13.137* -30.662** -25.322** -24.76*** (-2.520) (-1.816) (-2.369) (-2.492) (-2.717) 
High R&D Firm 6.610***     (2.991)     
(IV Diversity)×(High R&D) -5.381**     (-2.310)     
High M/B Firm  0.603*     (1.902)    
(IV Diversity)×(High M/B)  -3.331***     (-2.759)    
High VIX Period   43.450***     (4.498)   
(IV Diversity)×(High VIX)   5.868**     (2.106)   
GroupThink Board    -0.887     (-0.568)  
(IV Diversity)×(GroupThink)    8.450***     (3.513)  
Co-Opted Board     -3.135***     (-3.270) 
(IV Diversity)×(Co-Opted) 
 
    3.853** 
    (2.184) 
     
Firm, CEO, Board, and  
HQ County Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
HQ County, Industry (FF-49), 
and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 21,572 21,572 21,572 21,572 21,572 
R-squared 0.256 0.280 0.512 0.331 0.299 
IV F-stat 18.12 18.12 18.12 18.12 18.12 





Table 8 – Board Diversity and Policy Persistence 
This table reports 2nd stage IV regression estimates of models where the dependent variable is indicated in the column title. Diversity Index and its 
interaction with the relevant policy variable are instrumented with the diversity of potential directors who reside more than 150 miles away but 
within a non-stop flight of the firm headquarters. Policy Index is the sum of the normalized values of (PP&E/Assets), (Advertising/Sales), Net 
Book Leverage, (Dividends/Assets), and (R&D/Assets). All models include the instrumented Diversity Index (not reported for brevity), industry 
(Fama-French 49), headquarters county, and year fixed effects, along with all time-varying control variables from Table 3. All standard errors are 
clustered at the firm level and account for the two-stage nature of the estimation. The corresponding t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 















         (Policy Variable)t 0.873*** 0.687*** 0.938*** 0.890*** 0.860*** 0.839*** 0.772*** 0.730*** 
 (2.505) (3.200) (3.419) (3.190) (3.418) (3.098) (3.409) (3.891)          (Instr. Diversity)t × 
(Policy Variable)t 
0.055*** 0.241*** 0.014** 0.082** 0.033* 0.091*** 0.149*** 0.145*** 
(2.830) (2.644) (2.174) (2.476) (1.787) (3.836) (4.438) (4.267) 
         Instrumented Board 
Diversity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm, CEO, Board, and 
HQ County Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
HQ Country, Industry 
(FF-49), and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 19,073 19,073 19,073 19,073 19,073 19,073 16,812 14,768 
R-squared 0.831 0.178 0.963 0.902 0.917 0.839 0.776 0.811 
IV F-stat 11.36 18.647 10.18 19.226 19.807 11.125 16.113 9.395 
Durbin p-value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
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Table 9 – Board diversity and firm policies 
This table reports 2nd stage IV regression estimates of models where the dependent variable indicated in 
the column title is standardized to have zero mean and standard deviation equal to one. Diversity Index is 
instrumented with the diversity of potential directors who reside more than 150 miles away but within a 
non-stop flight of the firm headquarters. All models include industry (Fama-French 49), headquarters 
county, and year fixed effects, along with all time-varying control variables from Table 3. Standard errors 
are clustered at the firm level and account for the two-stage nature of the estimation. The corresponding t-
statistics are reported in parenthesis.  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 










         
Instrumented 
Diversity Index 
-1.228*** -0.573*** 1.094** 0.011 0.917*** 
(-2.730) (-3.037) (2.254) (0.532) (3.269) 
Firm, CEO, Board, and 
HQ County Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
HQ County, Industry  
(FF-49), and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 21,572 21,572 21,572 21,572 21,572 
R-squared 0.222 0.289 0.240 0.247 0.261 
IV F-stat 22.15 22.15 19.19 15.12 20.01 







Table 10 – Board diversity and firm innovation output 
This table reports 2nd stage IV regression estimates of models where the dependent variable indicated in 
the column title is standardized to have zero mean and standard deviation equal to one. Diversity Index is 
instrumented with the diversity of potential directors who reside more than 150 miles away but within a 
non-stop flight of the firm headquarters. All models include industry (Fama-French 49), headquarters 
county, and year fixed effects, along with all time-varying control variables from Table 3. Standard errors 
are clustered at the firm level and account for the two-stage nature of the estimation. The corresponding t-
statistics are reported in parenthesis. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 








2.793*** 1.732** 2.632*** 1.687*** 1.746** 
(4.064) (2.017) (4.025) (3.750) (2.450) 
Firm, CEO, Board, and 
HQ County Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
HQ County, Industry 
(FF-49), and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 20,702 9,129 20,702 20,702 11,622 
R-squared 0.390 0.468 0.390 0.326 0.395 
IV F-stat 42.73 17.53 42.73 42.73 20.21 














Table 11 – Board diversity and firm performance 
This table reports 2nd stage IV regression estimates of models where the dependent variable indicated in 
the column title is standardized to have zero mean and standard deviation equal to one. Diversity Index is 
instrumented with the diversity of potential directors who reside more than 150 miles away but within a 
non-stop flight of the firm headquarters. All models include industry (Fama-French 49), headquarters 
county, and year fixed effects, along with all time-varying control variables from Table 3. Standard errors 
are clustered at the firm level and account for the two-stage nature of the estimation. The corresponding t-




Dependent Variable: EBITDA/Assets ln(Q) 
   Instrumented Diversity Index 2.038*** 5.725*** 
 
(2.627) (3.402) 
Firm, CEO, Board, and 
HQ County Controls Yes Yes 
HQ County, Industry  
(FF-49), and Year FE Yes Yes 
Observations 21,572 21,572 
R-squared 0.243 0.277 
IV F-stat 27.57 36.49 





Table 12 – When is board diversity more beneficial? Conditional effects on performance 
This table reports 2nd stage IV regression estimates of models where the dependent variable indicated in 
the panel title is standardized to have zero mean and standard deviation equal to one. Diversity Index and 
its interaction with the indicator variables are instrumented with the diversity of potential directors who 
reside more than 150 miles away but within a non-stop flight of the firm headquarters. All models include 
industry (Fama-French 49), headquarters county, and year fixed effects, along with all time-varying 
control variables from Table 3. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and account for the two-
stage nature of the estimation. The corresponding t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. 
Panel A: Dependent Variable: Profitability 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Instrumented Diversity Index 1.445** 1.994** 2.078** 1.589** 1.642*** (2.471) (2.551) (2.322) (2.420) (2.582) 
High R&D Firm -0.331**     (-2.384)     
(IV Diversity)×(High R&D) 0.078     (0.552)     
High M/B Firm  0.287***     (3.920)    
(IV Diversity)×(High M/B)  0.005     (0.042)    
High VIX Period   -1.479**     (-2.251)   
(IV Diversity)×(High VIX)   -0.435**     (-2.293)   
GroupThink Board    -0.050     (-0.562)  
(IV Diversity)×(GroupThink)    -0.102     (-0.809)  
Co-Opted Board     0.133**     (1.996) 
(IV Diversity)×(Co-Opted) 
 
    -0.220* 
    (-1.882) 
     
Firm, CEO, Board, and  
HQ County Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
HQ County, Industry  
(FF-49), and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 21,572 21,572 21,572 21,572 21,572 
R-squared 0.125 0.124 0.256 0.135 0.141 
IV F-stat 17.78 17.78 18.12 17.78 17.78 





Panel B: Dependent Variable: ln(Q) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Instrumented Diversity Index 
2.978*** 4.435*** 3.763** 3.161*** 3.096*** 
(2.792) (2.844) (2.388) (2.756) (2.645) 
High R&D Firm 
-0.395*     
(-1.770)     
(IV Diversity)×(High R&D) 
-0.345     
(-1.443)     
High M/B Firm  
0.725***    
 (5.162)    
(IV Diversity)×(High M/B)  
-0.119    
 (-0.456)    
High VIX Period   -2.691**     (-2.332)   
(IV Diversity)×(High VIX)   -0.572*     (-1.779)   
GroupThink Board   
 -0.294*  
   (-1.859)  
(IV Diversity)×(GroupThink)   
 -0.034  
   (-0.171)  
Co-Opted Board    
 0.245** 
    (2.049) 
(IV Diversity)×(Co-Opted) 
 
    -0.297 
    (-1.400) 
     
Firm, CEO, Board, and  
HQ County Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
HQ County, Industry  
(FF-49), and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 21,572 21,572 21,572 21,572 21,572 
R-squared 0.125 0.124 0.280 0.138 0.129 
IV F-stat 17.78 17.78 18.12 17.78 17.78 
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The figure displays the average value the diversity index component of firms headquartered in each state. 
Averages are based on firm year observations over the entire sample period. States with fewer than 
twenty firm year observations are set to missing (shown in black). Construction of the index is detailed in 
the data section of the text.   
Figure IA1.A – Gender Diversity 
 
Figure IA1.B – Age Diversity 
 





Figure IA1.D – Diversity in Financial Expertise
 
Figure IA1.E – Education Institution Diversity 
 
 
Figure IA1.F – Board Experience Diversity 
 
   
 Table IA.1 – Alternative measures of stock return volatility 
This table reports regression estimates of models where the dependent variable is the annualized standard 
deviation of firm stock returns for the current year. Across all panels, the dependent variable in column 1 
is the standard deviation of daily idiosyncratic returns from the market model, while it is the standard 
deviation of monthly raw and idiosyncratic stock returns in columns 3 and 4, respectively. Board 
Diversity Index is normalized by its sample mean and standard deviation. Panel A reports OLS estimates 
from models with industry (Fama-French 49), headquarters county, and year fixed effects, while Panel B 
reports OLS estimates from models with firm and year fixed effects. Panel C report 2nd stage IV estimates 
from models with industry (Fama-French 49), headquarters county, and year fixed effects. All control 
variables from Panel A are also included in Panels B and C, but are omitted for brevity. All standard 
errors are cluster at the firm-level and, in Panel C, account for the two step nature of the estimation. The 
corresponding t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. 
Panel A: OLS Estimates  
  (1) (2) (3) 





    Board Diversity Index -0.729*** -0.788*** -0.791*** 
 (-4.111) (-3.698) (-3.963) Ln(Assets) -3.266*** -2.266*** -3.095*** 
 (-12.028) (-7.296) (-10.546) M/B 0.534** 0.721** 0.516* 
 (2.343) (2.379) (1.800) Mkt. Lev. 3.082*** 3.753*** 3.551*** 
 (10.320) (10.643) (10.733) Tangibility 0.912*** 1.111*** 1.106*** 
 (3.110) (3.229) (3.379) Cash/Asset 2.099*** 2.490*** 2.207*** 
 (9.500) (9.054) (8.977) I(Dividend Paying) -2.385*** -2.456*** -2.432*** 
 (-11.704) (-10.213) (-10.751) ROA -4.071*** -4.726*** -4.170*** 
 (-4.261) (-3.927) (-4.242) (R&D/Assets) 1.096*** 1.308*** 1.003*** 
 (3.278) (3.087) (2.751) Ln(1+Firm Age) -1.462*** -1.408*** -1.429*** 
 (-7.236) (-5.892) (-6.459) Ln (Board Size) -0.932*** -1.005*** -0.924*** 
 (-4.521) (-4.212) (-4.032) Ln(Average Board Age) -1.247*** -1.422*** -1.185*** 
 (-6.781) (-6.292) (-5.441) Ln(1+CEO Tenure) -0.527*** -0.382** -0.434** 
 
(-3.217) (-1.972) (-2.413) 
CEO is Chair and President -0.054 -0.111 0.006 
 
(-0.391) (-0.680) (0.037) 
County Per Capita Income Growth 0.195 -0.256 0.604** 
 (0.821) (-0.839) (2.315) 
County Population Growth -0.246* -0.428** -0.292** 
  (-1.713) (-2.286) (-2.109) 
Ln(County Per Capita Income) 2.570** 4.157*** 1.379 
 (2.389) (3.088) (1.095) 
Ln(County Population) -5.258* -6.049* -6.269** 
 (-1.781) (-1.827) (-1.996) 
Diversity of Local Directors -0.572*** -0.449** -0.279 
 (-3.424) (-2.308) (-1.447) 
    Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry (FF-49) FE Yes Yes Yes 
HQ County FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 21,572 21,572 21,572 
R-squared 0.591 0.487 0.470 
 
Panel B: OLS Estimates with Firm Fixed Effects 
  (1) (3) (4) 





    Board Diversity Index -0.477** -0.764*** -0.741*** 
 (-2.006) (-2.679) (-2.915) 
    All Time-varying Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 21,572 21,572 21,572 
R-squared 0.742 0.649 0.634 
 
Panel C: 2nd Stage IV Estimates  
  (1) (3) (4) 





    Instrumented Board Diversity Index -25.608*** -27.211*** -26.841*** 
 (-2.631) (-2.618) (-2.646) 
    All Time-varying Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry (FF-49) FE Yes Yes Yes 
HQ County FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 21,572 21,572 21,572 
R-squared 0.392 0.411 0.380 
IV F-stat 23.08 23.08 23.08 
Durbin pval <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
  
 Table IA.2 – Board Diversity and Firm Volatility – No Local Director Control 
This table reports 1st and 2nd stage IV regression estimates obtained when the board diversity is 
instrumented with the diversity of potential directors who reside more than 150 miles away but within a 
non-stop flight of the firm headquarters. All models include industry (Fama-French 49), headquarters 
county, and year fixed effects. All standard errors are clustered at the firm level and account for the two-
stage nature of the estimation. The corresponding t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. 






   Instrumented Diversity Index  -21.492*** 
  (-2.902) Diversity of Nonlocal Directors  
w/in Non-Stop Flight 
0.060***  
(3.347)  
   
Ln(Assets) 0.253*** 3.289 
 (12.162) (1.539) M/B 0.026** 1.751*** 
 (2.109) (3.739) Mkt. Lev. -0.011 2.635*** 
 (-0.712) (5.951) Tangibility 0.005 1.120* 
 (0.219) (1.914) Cash/Asset -0.007 2.275*** 
 (-0.427) (5.267) I(Dividend Paying) 0.005 -2.363*** 
 (0.339) (-5.869) ROA 0.023** -4.144*** 
 (2.110) (-4.049) (R&D/Assets) 0.067*** 2.428*** 
 (3.644) (3.239) Ln(1+Firm Age) 0.035** -0.699 
 (2.040) (-1.402) Ln (Board Size) 0.214*** 3.334** 
 (11.317) (2.043) Ln(Average Board Age) -0.051*** -2.455*** 
 (-3.012) (-4.551) Ln(1+CEO Tenure) -0.026** -0.949** 
 
(-2.044) (-2.576) 
CEO is Chair and President 0.018* 0.294 
 
(1.751) (0.994) 
County Per Capita Income Growth -0.024** -0.553 
 (-2.530) (-1.507) 
County Population Growth 0.000 -0.251 
 (0.036) (-0.999) 
Ln(County Per Capita Income) 0.040 5.448** 
 (0.474) (2.565) 
Ln(County Population) -0.152 -6.817 
 (-0.658) (-1.137) 
 Year FE Yes Yes 
Industry (FF-49) FE Yes Yes 
HQ County FE Yes Yes 
Firm FE No No 
Observations 21,572 21,572 
R-squared 0.390 0.298 
IV F-stat  32.72 
Durbin p-val.  < 0.001 
  
 Table IA.3 – Board Diveristy and Firm Stock Volatility by subsamples of local diversity 
This table reports 1st and 2nd stage IV regression estimates obtained when the board diversity is 
instrumented with the diversity of potential directors who reside more than 150 miles away but within a 
non-stop flight of the firm headquarters. The first two columns restrict the sample to those counties with 
below median local potential board member diversity while the last two columns restrict the sample to 
those counties with above median local potential board member diversity. All models include industry 
(Fama-French 49), headquarters county, and year fixed effects and all control variables (omitted for 
brevity) from Table 3. All standard errors are clustered at the firm level and account for the two-stage 
nature of the estimation. The corresponding t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. 










County-year Subsamples: Low Local Diversity High Local Diversity 
     Instrumented Diversity Index  -25.041**  -25.376** 
  (-2.261)  (-2.227) Diversity of Nonlocal Directors 
w/in Non-Stop Flight 
0.043**  0.065***  
(2.397)  (2.581)  
     
Diversity of Local Directors 0.016 0.262 0.090** 2.386 
 (1.120) (0.558) (2.202) (1.564) 
All Time-varying Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry (FF-49) FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
HQ County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 10,779 10,779 10,783 10,783 
R-squared 0.319 0.398 0.286 0.380 
IV F-stat  13.45  16.72 
Durbin p-val.  < 0.001  < 0.001 
  
 Table IA.4 – Board diversity index components and firm stock volatility  
This table reports OLS regression estimates of models where the dependent variable is the annualized 
standard deviation of the firm’s daily stock returns. All diversity variables are normalized by their sample 
mean and standard deviation. STDEV AGE is the standard deviation of board members’ age. HHI 
Ethnicity is the standard HHI index over the ethnic groups that board members belong to (as categorized 
by Risk Metrics). HHI Bachelors is the HHI over the different degree granting institutions where board 
members received the Bachelors degree. HHI Financial Expert is the concentration of board members 
that are financial experts as classified by RiskMetrics. Mean # of Other Boards is the average number of 
other boards that the firm's board members serve on for the previous year. N(X) below denotes the 
normalized version of X. Panel A reports estimates obtained when each component of the diversity index 
is examined separately, Panel B reports estimates obtained by excluding each component of the diversity 
index in turn. All models include industry (Fama-French 49), headquarters county, and year fixed effects, 
along with all time-varying control variables from Table 3 in the main text. Standard errors are clustered 
at the firm level and the corresponding t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. 
Panel A: OLS Estimates using Individual Components of the Diversity Index 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       N(% Board Female) -0.093      
 (-0.348)      N(STDEV Age)  -0.414*     
  (-1.716)     - N(HHI Ethnicity)   -0.436    
   (-1.376)    - N(HHI Bachelors)    -0.150   
    (-0.634)   - N(HHI Financial Expert)     -0.118  
     (-0.538)  N(Mean # of Other Boards)      -0.380 
      (-1.606) 
       All Time-varying Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry (FF-49) FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
HQ County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 21,572 21,572 21,572 21,572 21,572 21,572 
R-squared 0.745 0.745 0.745 0.745 0.745 0.745 
 
  
 Panel B: OLS Estimates using Restricted Diversity Index 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        Diversity Index excl. Female -0.615**      
 
(-2.287)      Diversity Index excl. Age  -0.508*     
  
(-1.705)     Diversity Index excl. Ethnicity   -0.622**    
   
(-2.272)    Diversity Index excl. Education    -0.509**   
    
(-2.102)   Diversity Index excl. Fin. Expert     -0.667**  
     
(-2.494)  Diversity Index excl. Other Boards      -0.508** 
      
(-1.992) 
       All Time-varying Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry (FF-49) FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
HQ County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 21,572 21,572 21,572 21,572 21,572 21,572 









 Table IA.5 – Components of Added Non-Executives Diversity and Non-Local Supply Diversity 
This table reports OLS estimates of models where the incremental diversity added by non-executives along each dimension is regressed on the 
corresponding component of diversity of potential directors who reside more than 150 miles away but within a non-stop flight of the firm 
headquarters. All models include industry (Fama-French 49), headquarters county, and year fixed effects, along with all time-varying control 
variables from Table 3 in the main text. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and the corresponding t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Dependent Variable: (Board Diversity - Exec. Diversity) for each component 
Diversity Component: ΔFemale ΔAge ΔBachelors ΔEthnic ΔFin. Expert ΔBoard Exp. ΔAll 
        
%Female Non-Local 0.022**       
 (1.96)       
Std. Age Non-Local  0.002      
  (0.141)      
-1*HHI_Bachelors Non-Local   -0.002     
   (-0.118)     
-1*HHI_Ethnicity Non-Local    0.023**    
    (2.032)    
-1*HHI_FinExpert Non-Local     0.040***   
     (3.021)   
Board Exp. Non-Local      0.030**  
      (2.287)  
Non-Local Diversity Index       0.039** 
       (2.019) 
All Time-varying Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry (FF-49) FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
HQ County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 21,572 21,572 21,572 21,572 21,572 21,572 21,572 
R-squared 0.212 0.147 0.270 0.179 0.211 0.166 0.188 
 Table IA.6 – Board Diversity and Firm Diversity 
This table reports OLS estimates of models where KLD scores of firm strength and weakness in terms of 
workforce diversity is regressed on the firm board diversity index. All models include industry (Fama-
French 49), headquarters county, and year fixed effects, along with all time-varying control variables 
from Table 3 in the main text. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and the corresponding t-
statistics are reported in parenthesis. 
  (1) (2) 
Dependent Variable: KLD Diversity Concerns Index 
KLD Diversity  
Strengths Index 
      





All Time-varying Controls Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Industry (FF-49) FE Yes Yes 
HQ County FE Yes Yes 
Observations 16,004 16,004 
R-squared 0.319 0.471 
 
  
 Table IA.7 – Instrumented added diversity of non-executives and firm policies 
This table reports 2nd stage IV regression estimates of models where the dependent variable indicated in 
the column title is standardized to have zero mean and standard deviation equal to one. Board Diversity 
Added by Non-Executives is instrumented with the diversity of potential directors who reside more than 
150 miles away but within a non-stop flight of the firm headquarters. All models include industry (Fama-
French 49), headquarters county, and year fixed effects, along with all time-varying control variables 
from Table 3 in the main text. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and account for the two-stage 
nature of the estimation. The corresponding t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable: Net Book Leverage 
Net Market 
Leverage Dividend/Equity Capex/Asset R&D/Asset 
           
Instrumented Board Diversity 
Added by Non-Executives 
-1.612** -0.751** 1.430* 0.187 1.208** 
(-2.016) (-2.097) (1.742) (0.566) (2.572) 
 
     
All Time-varying Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry (FF-49) FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
HQ County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 21,572 21,572 21,572 21,572 21,572 
R-squared 0.256 0.288 0.244 0.245 0.262 
IV F-stat 19.98 19.98 19.99 19.35 19.35 
Durbin pval <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
 
  
 Table IA.8 – Instrumented added diversity of non-executives and firm innovation 
This table reports the 2nd stage IV regression estimates of models where the dependent variable indicated 
in the column title is standardized to have zero mean and standard deviation equal to one. Board Diversity 
Added by Non-Executives is instrumented with the diversity of potential directors who reside more than 
150 miles away but within a non-stop flight of the firm headquarters. All models include industry (Fama-
French 49), headquarters county, and year fixed effects, along with all time-varying control variables 
from Table 3 in the main text. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and account for the two-stage 
nature of the estimation. The corresponding t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable: Ln(1+Patents) Patents/R&D Ln(1+Citations) Ln(1+Cit./Pat.) 
      
Instrumented Board Diversity 
Added by Non-Executives 
3.564*** 1.608* 3.360*** 2.154*** 
(2.891) (1.931) (2.892) (2.793) 
 
    
All Time-varying Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry (FF-49) FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
HQ County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 20,702 9,129 20,702 20,702 
R-squared 0.184 0.261 0.195 0.264 
IV F-stat 24.39 15.65 24.39 24.39 
Durbin pval <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
 
  
 Table IA.9 – Board diversity and board frictions 
This table reports regression estimates of models where the dependent variable indicated in the column 
title is standardized to have zero mean and standard deviation equal to one. Columns (1) and (3) display 
OLS estimates, and columns (2) and (4) display 2nd stage IV estimates. Diversity Index is instrumented 
with the diversity of potential directors who reside more than 150 miles away but within a non-stop flight 
of the firm headquarters. All models include industry (Fama-French 49), headquarters county, and year 
fixed effects, along with all time-varying control variables from Table 3. Standard errors are clustered at 
the firm level and account for the two-stage nature of the estimation where appropriate. The 
corresponding t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable: Board 3-Year Turnover Rate % Directors Attend <75% Meetings 




   
Diversity Index 0.003** -0.109 0.001*** 0.003 
 (2.154) (-0.630) (2.952) (0.494) 
     
All Time-varying Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry (FF-49) FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
HQ County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 17,981 17,981 21,488 21,488 
R-squared 0.512 0.522 0.322 0.333 
 
  
 Table IA.10 – Instrumented added diversity of non-executives and firm performance 
This table reports second stage IV regression estimates of models where the dependent variable indicated 
in the column title is standardized to have zero mean and standard deviation equal to one. Board Diversity 
Added by Non-Executives is instrumented with the diversity of potential directors who reside more than 
150 miles away but within a non-stop flight of the firm headquarters. All models include industry (Fama-
French 49), headquarters county, and year fixed effects, along with all time-varying control variables 
from Table 3 in the main text. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and account for the two-stage 
nature of the estimation. The corresponding t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. 
 
  (1) (2) 
Dependent Variable: EBITDA/Assets ln(Q) 
 
  Instrumented Board Diversity 
Added by Non-Executives 
2.737* 6.595*** 
(1.910) (2.705) 
   
All Time-varying Controls Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Industry (FF-49) FE Yes Yes 
HQ County FE Yes Yes 
Observations 21,572 21,572 
R-squared 0.188 0.185 
IV F-stat 19.91 19.87 




 Table IA.11 – Robustness: Instrumented board diversity and volatility, controlling for non-linear effects of firm and board sizes 
The table reports 2nd stage IV estimates for the relation between board diversity and stock return volatility when the baseline specification in Table 
3 of the main text is augmented with additional controls for firm and board size. All specifications are identical to those in the main text, except for 
the inclusion of additional controls for firm and board size. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and account for the two-stage nature of 
the estimation. The corresponding t-statistics are in parenthesis. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
           
Instrumented Diversity Index -20.76*** -22.98** -15.33*** -24.66*** -25.69*** -23.73*** -19.74*** -25.46** -15.39*** 
 (-2.641) (-2.550) (-6.878) (-2.623) (-2.838) (-2.731) (-2.770) (-2.544) (-6.916) 
All Time-varying Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes No Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes 
Industry (FF-49) FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
HQ County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Size Decile FE Yes No No No No No Yes No No 
Firm Size Decile ×Year FE No Yes No No No No No Yes No 
Firm Size 3rd Order Poly No No Yes No No No No No Yes 
Board Size Quintile FE No No No Yes No No No Yes No 
Board Size Quintile ×Year FE No No No No Yes No Yes No No 
Board Size 3rd Order Poly No No No No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 21,572 21,572 21,572 21,572 21,572 21,572 21,572 21,572 21,572 
R-squared 0.390 0.395 0.318 0.387 0.386 0.393 0.387 0.395 0.318 
IV F-stat 27.20 24.11 275.7 24.30 27.47 26.90 30.56 22.10 27.76 
Durbin pval <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
 Table IA.12 – Robustness: Instrumented board diversity and volatility, dropping extreme sizes and 
most-connected cities 
The table reports 2nd stage IV estimates for the relation between board diversity and stock return volatility 
similar to Table 3 of the main text while excluding from the sample extreme firm and board sizes, i.e., top 
and bottom decile (Columns 1-4), and most-connected cities (Column 5). Note that in Column 5 the most-
connected cities are excluded from pool of potential directors when calculating the instrument and not the 
final regression, thus the sample size remains the same. All specifications are identical to those in the 
main text. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and account for the two-stage nature of the 
estimation. The corresponding t-statistics are in parenthesis. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
No small  
firms 
No large  
firms 
No small  
boards 





           
Instrumented Diversity Index -23.455*** -20.075* -25.531*** -22.072** -16.471*** 
 
(-2.815) (-1.650) (-2.786) (-2.001) (-3.801) 
All Time-varying Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry (FF-49) FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
HQ County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 19,584 19,603 16,483 18,199 21,572 
R-squared 0.384 0.375 0.390 0.372 0.265 
IV F-stat 29.39 19.92 25.26 14.25 55.98 
Durbin pval <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 < 0.001 
 
  
 Table IA.13 – Robustness: Instrumented board diversity and volatility, by firm size 
    
Non-Local Supply Diversity IV -13.263*** 
 
(-3.967) 
IV * Size Tercile 2 2.425 
 
(1.049) 
IV * Size Tercile 3 -2.108 
 
(-0.921) 
Size Tercile 2 -1.367 
 
(-1.390) 
Size Tercile 3 1.196 
 
(0.779) 
All Time-varying Controls Yes 
Year FE Yes 
Industry (FF-49) FE Yes 
HQ County FE Yes 
Observations 21,572 
R-squared 0.393 
IV F-stat 35.23 
Durbin pval <0.001 
 
 
 Table IA.14 – Alternative IV: Board diversity and stock return volatility 
The table reports 2nd stage IV estimates for the relation between board diversity and stock return volatility 
(Panel A), persistence of firm policies (Panel B), the level of firm policies (Panel C), innovation (Panel 
D), and performance (Panel E) using a demand-based instrument for board diversity instead of the 
baseline supply-based instrument. FF5/Size Matched Diversity is the average director diversity across 
firms in the same size quintile and Fama-French 49 industry – excluding each firm actual board. All 
specifications are identical to those in the main text, except for the alternative instrument of board 
diversity. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and account for the two-stage nature of the 
estimation. The corresponding t-statistics are in parenthesis. 
Panel A: Effect of Demand-based Instrument for Diversity on Stock Volatility 
  (1) (2) 
 First Stage Second Stage 
   Instrumented Diversity Index  -5.167*** 
  (-7.358) FF5/Size Matched Diversity 0.613***  
 (7.114)  
   All Time-varying Controls Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Industry (FF-49) FE Yes Yes 
County HQ FE Yes Yes 
Observations 21,572 21,572 
R-squared 0.561 0.417 






 Panel B: Effect of Demand-based Instrument for Diversity on Persistence of Firm Policies 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 















         
(Policy Variable)t 0.872*** 0.383*** 0.937*** 0.907*** 0.881*** 0.851*** 0.797*** 0.754*** 
 (2.935) (2.818) (2.904) (2.783) (2.918) (2.790) (2.837) (2.993)          (Instr. Diversity)t × 
(Policy Variable)t 
0.023*** 0.252*** 0.009*** 0.029 0.077* 0.048*** 0.052*** 0.050** 
(2.636) (3.466) (2.749) (1.630) (1.890) (3.863) (3.447) (2.493) 
                  
Instrumented Diversity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
All Time-varying 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
HQ Country, Industry 
(FF-49), and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 19,073 19,073 19,073 19,073 19,073 19,073 16,812 14,786 
R-squared 0.639 0.312 0.566 0.807 0.681 0.846 0.797 0.754 
IV F-stat 16.72 16.51 16.45 19.40 18.80 17.57 15.32 13.83 
Durbin p-value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
 
Panel C: Effect of Demand-based Instrument for Diversity on Firm Policies 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
Dependent Variable: Net Book Leverage Net Market Leverage Dividend/ Equity CAPX/Assets R&D/Asset 
      
Instrumented Diversity Index 0.029 -0.132*** 0.121*** 0.091 0.056 
 (0.644) (-2.847) (3.229) (1.211) (1.509)       
All Time-varying Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
HQ Country, Industry (FF-49), and 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 21,572 21,572 21,572 21,572 21,572 
R-squared 0.297 0.051 0.131 0.150 0.474 
IV F-stat 41.41 41.41 38.88 38.88 39.31 
Durbin pval <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
 Panel D: Effect of Demand-based Instrument for Diversity on Innovation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable: Ln(1+Patents) Patents/R&D Ln(1+Citations) Ln(1+Cit./Pat.) 
          
Instrumented Diversity Index 0.182*** 0.092 0.133*** 0.087** 
 
(4.052) (1.081) (3.009) (2.085) 
 
    
All Time-varying Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry (FF-49) FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
HQ County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 21,572 21,572 21,572 21,572 
R-squared 0.352 0.249 0.396 0.294 
IV F-stat 43.47 28.85 43.47 43.47 
Durbin pval <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
 
Panel E: Effect of Demand-based Instrument for Diversity on Performance 
  (1) (2) 









All Time-varying Controls Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Industry (FF-49) FE Yes Yes 
HQ County FE Yes Yes 
Observations 21,572 21,572 
R-squared 0.212 0.255 
IV F-stat 38.62 49.19 
Durbin pval <0.001 <0.001 
 Table IA.15 – Principal Component Analysis of Board Diversity  
This table reports the results of the principal component analysis conducted on the six measures of 
diversity used to construct the board diversity index in the main text. Panel A reports the eigenvectors 
with the corresponding loadings. Panel B reports the eigenvalues associated with each principal 
component and the fraction of common variation of the six measures that is explained by each 
component. Panel C reports simple OLS regression estimates for the relation between the first principal 
component and each measure of diversity, with standard errors clustered at the firm-level. The 
corresponding t-statistics are in parenthesis. 
Panel A – Eigenvectors and factor loadings 
 
 Panel B – Eigenvalues and Common Variation 
 
Panel C – Regression of first principal component of diversity on each factor 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
% Board Female -4.584***      
 (-75.086)      STDEV Age  0.194***     
  (78.441)     -1 × HHI Ethnicity   -0.732***    
   (14.437)    -1 × HHI Bachelors    -2.824***   
    (169.542)   -1 × HHI Fin. Expert     -5.217***  
     (91.497)  Mean # of Other Boards      -1.099*** 
      (-126.207) Observations 21,572 21,572 21,572 21,572 21,572 21,572 
R-squared 0.207 0.222 0.010 0.571 0.280 0.425 
       
 
1st Comp. 2nd Comp. 3rd Comp. 4th Comp. 5th Comp. 6th Comp. 
% Female -0.3477 0.435 -0.2632 0.7521 -0.109 0.2077 
Std. Dev. Age 0.3598 -0.4675 0.2254 0.5836 0.51 0.0216 
HHI Ethnicity 0.0747 0.603 0.7739 0.0017 0.1594 -0.0798 
HHI Bachelors 0.5773 0.1976 -0.1132 -0.1119 -0.0806 0.7719 
HHI Fin. Expert 0.4038 0.4342 -0.5111 -0.0571 0.4235 -0.4522 
Mean Boards  -0.4978 0.0303 -0.083 -0.2794 0.7188 0.3869 
 Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
1st Comp. 1.7144 0.6920 0.2857 0.2857 
2nd Comp. 1.0223 0.0294 0.1704 0.4561 
3rd Comp. 0.9928 0.1175 0.1655 0.6216 
4th Comp. 0.8753 0.0842 0.1459 0.7675 
5th Comp. 0.7910 0.1869 0.1318 0.8993 
6th Comp. 0.6040 -- 0.1007 1 
 Table IA.16 – Principal Components Analysis: Effects of board diversity 
The table reports regression estimates for the effects board diversity using the PCA-based measure of 
diversity instead of the diversity index with predetermined weights used in the main text. The panels 
analyze the effect of board diversity on stock return volatility (Panel A), persistence of firm policies 
(Panel B), the level of firm policies (Panel C), innovation (Panel D), and performance (Panel E) using the 
first principal component of the diversity index. All specifications are identical to those reported in the 
main text, except for the alternative underlying measure of board diversity. Standard errors are clustered 
at the firm level in all panels and account for the two-stage nature of the estimation where appropriate. 
The corresponding t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. 
Panel A: First Principal Component of Board Diversity and Stock Volatility 






    PC Diversity -0.690***   
 (-3.196)   Instrumented PC Diversity   -19.800*** 
   (-3.592) Diversity of Directors w/ Non-Stop Flight  0.067***  
  (4.311)  All Time-varying Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry (FF-49) FE Yes Yes Yes 
HQ County FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 21,572 21,572 21,572 
R-squared 0.600 0.391 0.468 
IV F-stat   23.82 
Durbin p-val.   < 0.001 
 
 Panel B: First Principal Component of Board Diversity and Persistence of Corporate Policies 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 















         (Policy Variable)t 0.879*** 0.466*** 0.938*** 0.904*** 0.871*** 0.852*** 0.792*** 0.748*** 
 (2.930) (3.756) (2.899) (2.870) (2.998) (3.576) (2.719) (2.984)          (Instr. PC Diversity)t × 
(Policy Variable)t 
0.061*** 0.220*** 0.016*** 0.082** 0.051* 0.088*** 0.143*** 0.138*** 
(3.296) (2.675) (3.528) (2.507) (1.879) (3.780) (4.539) (4.000) 
         Instrumented Diversity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
All Time-varying 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
HQ Country, Industry 
(FF-49), and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 19,073 19,073 19,073 19,073 19,073 19,073 16,812 14,786 
R-squared 0.834 0.085 0.764 0.806 0.768 0.844 0.789 0.745 
IV F-stat 26.03 21.06 21.06 21.38 18.32 20.05 21.3 18.8 
Durbin p-value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
 
Panel C: First Principal Component of Board Diversity and Corporate Policies 












           
Instr. PC Diversity -0.831*** -0.387*** 0.808*** 0.012 0.711*** 
 
(-3.580) (-4.434) (2.669) (0.340) (3.820) 
All Time-varying Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
HQ Country, Industry (FF-49), 
and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 21,572 21,572 21,572 21,572 21,572 
R-squared 0.222 0.289 0.240 0.247 0.261 
IV F-stat 22.15 22.15 19.19 15.12 20.01 
Durbin pval <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
 Panel D: First Principal Component of Board Diversity and Innovation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable: Ln(1+Patents) Patents/R&D Ln(1+Citations) Ln(1+Cit./Pat.) 
      
Instrumented (-1×First PC) 2.139*** 2.140* 2.016*** 1.293*** 
 
(5.622) (1.926) (5.560) (4.905) 
All Time-varying Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry (FF-49) FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
HQ County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 20,702 9,129 20,702 20,702 
R-squared 0.390 0.468 0.390 0.326 
IV F-stat 42.73 17.53 42.73 42.73 
Durbin pval <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
 
Panel E: First Principal Component of Board Diversity and Performance 
  (1) (2) 
Dependent Variable: EBITDA/Assets ln(Q) 
   Instrumented (-1×First PC) 1.509*** 4.430*** 
 
(3.444) (4.725) 
All Time-varying Controls Yes Yes 
Industry (FF-49) FE Yes Yes 
HQ County FE Yes Yes 
Observations 21,572 21,572 
R-squared 0.243 0.277 
IV F-stat 27.57 36.49 
Durbin pval <0.001 <0.001 
 
